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Gross: Undermining Worker Safety and Health Protection through Statutory

UNDERMINING WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH PROTECTION
THROUGH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

James A. Gross*
A. INTRODUCTION

Workers now and throughout the history of work, here and
around the world and in a wide-range of employment settings,
commonly face a life-changing dilemma when confronted with serious hazards: the choice of continuing to work and thereby risking
their lives and limbs or refusing to work and thereby risking their
jobs and income.
In the United States there are certain laws that appear to
protect workers from having to make that choice.' In 1935, the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 2 particularly Section 7,
promised workers protection of their right to engage in concerted
activity for their mutual aid, and the right collectively to negotiate
terms and conditions of their employment-including workplace
safety and health. 3 The Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA in
* Professor of Labor Relations at the JLR School, Cornell University. He authored a multi-volume study of the NLRA and the NLRB as well as other books
and articles dealing with worker rights as human rights, including: A SHAMEFUL
BUSINESS: THE CASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (Cor-

nell University Press, 2010) and RIGHTS, NOT INTERESTS RESOLVING VALUE
(Cornell University
Press 2017). The author also extends special thanks to Alison Woody and Stasia
Skalbania (former Cornell Worker Institute Fellows) and my Cornell colleague
Rhonda Clouse for their research assistance and insights during the preparation
of this article.
'National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1935).
z 29 U.S.C. § 151.
3 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
(1947).
CLASHES UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
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19474 also promised workers in Section 502 that, if they ceased
work "in good faith because of abnormally dangerous working
conditions," their work stoppage would not be deemed a strike. 5
In another unprecedented action, Congress stated that its intent in
enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") in
19706 was "to assure so far as possible every working man and
woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 7
This paper discusses how decision-makers who have interpreted the apparently protective and preventive language of the
NLRA and OSHA have created a system of rules and requirements
that make it extremely difficult, if not impossible in many situations, for workers to secure these statutory protections. 8 Consequently, rather than freeing workers from the workplace safety and
health dilemma, decision-makers have chosen to perpetuate the dilemma by keeping the risk of refusal high.9
The right of workers to refuse work for reasons of safety
and health is central to this discussion. Decision-makers have
made choices concerning how much control, if any, workers have
over their own health and safety at their workplaces by stifling
employee self-help efforts. By interpreting NLRA Sections 502
and 7 and OSHA to protect employer interests rather than employee rights, they have resolved the clash between an asserted right to
work in safe and healthful conditions on the one hand and economic considerations such as the maintenance of production and
profits, costs,10 labor relations "stability" and management authority
on the other.
In the process, decision-makers have treated the right to refuse work that threatens health and safety as an ordinary labormanagement issue concerning typical economic subjects such as

4

29 U.S.C. § 143 (4).

5id.
6

(1970).

Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678

7 29 U.S.C.

§ 651.

8 See TNS, Inc., v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 392 (6th Cir. 2002).
9

Id.

10

29 U.S.C. § 143(4); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651.
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wages, hours, seniority, and vacations. 1 ' That is in sharp contrast
to finding something extraordinarily different about worker safety
and health because the right to life is being asserted--once described by former Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz as placing
"the absolute priority of individual
over institutional interests and
12
values."
economic
over
of human
This paper proposes new rules based on different values
and standards of judgment than those underlying the current state
of workers' right to refuse work that they believe threatens their
health and safety. The process of dislodging established mindsets
by creating new perspectives 3 cannot be accomplished without a
thorough review and understanding of the values and standards of
judgment currently being
applied to Sections 502 and 7 of the
14
NLRA and to OSHA.
More specifically, the proposal here is to use OSHA's Article 5(a)(1), often referred to as the General Duty clause-which
obliges employers to provide work and workplaces "free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm"15-as the standard to be used in establishing the nature of workers' right to refuse work that is unsafe or
unhealthful. 16 This statutory language, requiring affirmative action, expresses a fundamentally different philosophy concerning
workplace safety and health and a recognition that employees had
the right to work free of serious dangers to their health and safety
and a recognition that it was the responsibility of their employers
to provide and maintain safe and healthful workplaces.1 This
helps explain why decision-makers have ignored the General Duty

11James A. Gross, The Broken Promisesof the NLRA and the Occupational Safety and Health Act: Conflicting Values and Conceptions of Rights and
Justice, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 351, 353 (1998).
12id.
13 But see Diane Carter Maleson, The HistoricalRoots of the
Legal System's Response to NuclearPower, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 597, 617 (1982).
14 29 U.S.C. § 143(4); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651.
15 29 U.S.C. §654(a)(1).
16 29
17

U.S.C. § 655(a).

id.
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clause in refusal to work cases and rarely used it in other safety
and health situations.
This paper demonstrates that application of OSHA Article
5(a)(1), the General Duty clause, and its principles would eliminate the key elements of the current interpretations of the NLRA
and OSHA that have perpetuated and worsened the workers' dilemma. The use of the General Duty clause in refusal to work situations, moreover, would not require any legislative changes.
This paper ends with a caveat which deserves emphasis at
the outset as well: One should never underestimate the ability of
decision-makers in the legal system to interpret words to mean
what they want them to mean.
B. WHAT IS ABNORMALLY DANGEROUS WORK? THE TNS
CASE

Tennessee Nuclear Specialties ("TNS") produced uranium8
ingots that were shipped to other facilities for further processing.'
The ingots were returned to TNS where they were turned into armor-piercing projectiles sold exclusively to the United States Air
Force. In the production process, the employer used uranium tetrafluoride called "greensalt" because of its green flour-like texture. 19 At every phase of the production process radioactive particles or dust from greensalt, uranium oxides, and uranium metals
were released into the air in the plant. 20 Depleted uranium is a radioactive carcinogen that can cause cancer in those consistently
exposed to even low levels, Uranium also has the potential to poison kidneys.2 1
The workers claimed that they were consistently overexposed to this radioactive and chemically toxic substance which
posed a serious threat to their health. 22 When TNS did not respond to their union's health and safety demands during collective

18See TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1992).
'9 Id. at 1391.
20 id.
21 Id.

22

at 1376 n.17.

Id. at 1390.
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bargaining or otherwise, they2 3refused to return to what they considered a hazardous worksite.
At midnight on April 30, 1981, approximately 100 men
and women employees of TNS, Inc. in Jonesboro, Tennessee,
stopped work in what is believed to be the first concerted protest
against abnormally dangerous working conditions in the nation's
next 20 years a congressional hearing, 25 two
history.24 Over the 24
NLRB decisions, 2 6 and two Circuit Courts of Appeals rulings 27 determined the fate of those TNS workers and their attempt to protect their own safety and health. 28 Those political, judicial and
quasi-judicial deliberations, moreover, also demonstrated the nearly insuperable impediments that confront workers everywhere
29
when they try to assert control over their own safety and health.
This case is discussed at length because it lays out the essential
reasoning used by decision-makers that is at the core of the current
rules and values governing workers' refusals to work for reasons
of safety and health-rules that have perpetuated the workers' dilemma. 3°
The protesters were women and men, mainly young (70
percent under 30 years of age,) and many were illiterate. 31 None
had more than a 1 2 th grade education (TNS did not require a high
32
None had previously worked
school diploma for employment).
23
24

TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1390.
Id.; John W. McKendree, TNS, Inc., and Oil Chemical andAtomic

Workers: Labor Section 502 and Workplace Safety, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 195, 196

(1989).2 5

Health Hazardsat TNS, Inc.: Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversightof the H. Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 97th Cong. 3 (1981)

(statement of Robert Smith Walker, Ranking Minority Leader) [hereinafter
Gore Hearings].
26

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1992); TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602

(1999).
27

Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir.

1999); TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2002).
28 See supra notes 25-27.
29 See supra notes 25-27.
3See TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348 (1992).
31Id. at 1398.
32 Id.
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with hazardous material.33 They were poorly trained and not prepared to understand
the precautions against exposure to dangerous
34
substances.
C. CONGRESSIONAL HEARING

The workers and their situation received national attention
when ther told their stories on the television program "60
Minutes." 5 One month later, the subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight of the House Committee on Science and Technology conducted a hearing into what "at first blush" appeared to be a
"classic labor dispute with each side exploiting any issue to get the
best settlement possible" as described by subcommittee Chairman
Albert Gore of Tennessee. 36 As Gore stated, what was different
here was a recognition that no employer, even Aerojet ("TNS"),
intent on staying within cost estimates in pursuit of excellence in
national defense, "has 37the right to endanger the heath of the citizens who work for it."

In Tennessee at the time, two governmental agencies
shared responsibility for the regulation of safety and health at
TNS. 38 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") had sole
jurisdiction over radiation exposures which, after 1965, was delegated to the Tennessee Division of Radiological Health ("TDRH")
subject to regular NCR evaluations. 39 After 1970, the Tennessee
Occupational Safety and Health agency ("TOSHA") had jurisdiction over exposures such as noise pollution, toxic dusts, and mechanical safety hazards. 40 The Director of TDRH told the House
Subcommittee that there
was "only occasional interaction" be41
tween the two agencies.
TNS, Inc., v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 397, 399.
35 Gore Hearings, supra note 25.
3

34

36

37

1d. at 1.

Id. at2.
Id. at 82.
39
Id. at 259.
40
Id. at 232-233, 250.
41
ld. at 229.
38
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The TDRH had conducted an investigation of TNS on September 20-21, 1979, three years after Aerojet had purchased TNS
and 19 months before the work stoppage. 42 The TDRH reported
"several disturbing aspects of their [TNS] overall radiological
safety program," including: a "general lack of [a] radiation safety
program," a failure to report overexposures; the absence of any
procedure for assessing individual intakes of radioactivity by exposed workers; the improper use of respiratory equipment in areas
of high concentration of airborne radioactive material; and the ab43
sence of a well-defined respirator program.
In a follow-up letter on December 3, 1979, TDRH also advised TNS that employee training to minimize radiation exposure
was "inadequate" as were personnel radiation monitoring records-pointing out that TDRH had brought those same "deficiencies" to the company's attention five years previously. 44 The letter
concluded: "it appears that a severe laxity in your facility's radiaattention should be
tion safety program has developed. Immediate
' 45
given to the upgrading of this program.
During another inspection of TNS on November 18-20,
1980, TDRH found many of the same violations including inadequate training of employees concerning radiation exposure.46
TDRH told the company on January 29, 1981, three months before
the work stoppage: "it appears that sufficient effort is not being
exerted to prevent the reoccurrence" of "items of non-compliance"
that previous inspections had cited.47
When pressed by Gore to evaluate his agency's performance given the lengthy persistence of the same violations, the
Director of TDRH replied that none of the violations were "imminent health hazards., 48 When asked by Gore if TDRH's finding
that TNS lacked a radiation safety program "wasn't a hazard to the
employees," the Director replied, "possibly those words were a lit42
43

Gore Hearings, supra note 25, at 122, 288, 308.
Id. at 137, 140.

at 140-142.
44Id.
45
1d. at 142.
461d.at 159-160.
47
1d. at 161.
4Id. at 280.
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tie strong.49 We found indications that the safety program could

be improved., 50 The Director added that his agency did not have
the authority "to levy civil penalties" and that the TNS situation
demonstrated the need for additional authority to achieve compliance with regulations.51
The Director of TDRH did acknowledge that over the years
the most persistent violation was the company's failure to provide
52
engineering such as a ventilation system to remove toxic dust.
The TOSHA Director testified that his agency, which did not conduct its first heath inspection of TNS until January 1981, found in
one area of the plant airborne concentrations of uranium dust 13
times above the "standard limit" considered safe.53 TOSHA told
the subcommittee that it could not evaluate exposure records because TNS did not have any data concerning worker exposure to
uranium dust.54
TOSHA characterized its toxic dust finding as "nonserious", however, because TNS employees were wearing respirators. 55 TOSHA and TDRH permitted respirators only as a temporary measure to reduce exposures. 56 Neither TDHR nor TOSHA
was aware that in January 1981 TNS had made full-time wearing
of respirators mandatory for workers in certain work areas.5
58
TDRH did not discover that until after the work stoppage began.
Gore said that he was "forced to conclude" that TNS
"viewed the employees in the nature of another raw material in the
production process and so long as you could get by with lax inspections not holding you accountable, you were willing to do
so. ' '59 The TNS workers testified that they had to take company
Gore Hearings, supra note 25, at 280.
id.
51 Id. at 228, 296.
52
Id. at 280.
53
1Id. at 262.
54
Id. at 252.
55
Id. at 262-263.
56
Id. at 263.
IId. at 228.
58 Id. at 228-229.
59
Id. at 108.
49
50
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officials at their word when they said the plant was safe because,
as one worker put it, "I don't know what the levels [of radiation]
are and stuff like that." 60 One worker who expressed concerns
about rumors of cancer and sterility, testified that the personnel director told him there was nothing in the plant "to hurt you" and
added, "I've got children. 61 There's nothing wrong with them and
nothing wrong with me." 62 When the same worker brought his
same concerns to the "health and safety man" he said he was told
that if he was "so worried about this place ...

why don't you go

hunt another job?, 63 When the employee said he was too old, the
personnel director "just laughed." 64 Another employee who asked
what to do about his "high uranium count" in his urine sample testified that the "Health and Safety Department" advised him to
drink beer to flush his kidneys.65
There was no on-the-job instruction of health and safety,
one worker said, "only go out there and do your work., 6 6 He add-

ed, "production came over human life." 6 7 Another worker told the
company, "you think we're just a bunch of dumb hillbillies"68 but
"we've got bodies and we got hearts and we've got feelings."
An internationally respected expert, Dr. Carl Morgan, who,
among other positions, had been director of the health physics laboratory at Oak Ridge National Laboratory for 29 years, also testified that working conditions at TNS were "among the worst of
any" he had seen in the "past 38 years" of examining and evaluating radiation programs. 69 He concluded that some TNS employees
had been subjected to serious health hazards, and that appropriate
measures had not been taken to remove or lessen the risks of those
hazards or the "fatal diseases which can be expected as a conse60
61

Gore Hearings, supra note 25, at 20.
Id. at 7.

62 Id.
63

Id. at8.

64 Id.
65 Id. at 5-6, 46-47.
66
Jd. at6.
67

68

Id.

Id. at 12.

69Id.

at 168.
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the "most elquence. ' ' 70 He also testified that TNS had "ignored"
71
ementary principles of good health and safety.,
Dr. Morgan could not understand how "[TNS] plant management could be so oblivious to the seriousness of continuous
and persistent extremely high levels of uranium and thorium in the
urine of its employees., 72 He also expressed disappointment with
TDRH's lack of enforcement of NRC regulations. 7 The Director
of the NRC's Office of State Programs testified that TNS was not
operating even "technically within the bounds of the applicable
regulations" but also that 7in4 regard to industry practices not many
"do things similar to this."
After the work stoppage began, TNS hired a consultant,
Radiation Management Corporation ("RMC"), to determine for
Aerojet TNS if it was "in compliance with the state of Tennessee
regulations." 75 In its report to the company on May 29, 1981,
RMC, "observed many areas of non-compliance" which "coupled
with the past history of whole body and extremity
over exposure
76
should be of great concern to management."
Among other criticisms, RMC cited a "lack of management commitment to a radiation safety program., 7 7 The RMC report called
for the installation of "engineered control solutions" to address
airborne toxic dust concentrations and said that the company's decision to wait months to do that was "not acceptable." 8 The report also criticized the company for not having a written policy for
respirator use, or adequate medical surveillance for respirator users: "It is too much to expect a person to wear a respirator day in
and day out without experiencing physiological and mental
strains.
70

79

Gore Hearings, supra note 25, at 168.
73.

71Id. at 168,
72 d. at 170.
73

1d. at 173.
Id. at 304.
75
Id. at 126.
76
Id. at 134.
77
Id. at 305.
71d. at 131, 134.
79Id. at 127.
74
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Aerojet did not inform TDRH or TOSHA or its union of the
existence of the RMC report.
When Chairman Gore called the
RMC report "a horror story" 81 and said he did not understand why
the company did not take the RMC report to the union, or admit
that the company was wrong, or try to resolve the problems, the
Vice President of Aerojet dismissed the RMC report as merely a
"one-shot, one-day observation. 82 He also revealed that after the
strike began and coincidental with the RMC report, many of the
report's
recommendations had already been "put in place" at
3
8

rNs.

The Vice President of Aerojet also charged the Union with
bad faith by using safety and health in an "unsuccessful attempt to
dictate how the company is managed,, 84 including management's
exclusive right to determine safety and health programs. 85 The
strike was not about employees safety and health, the Aerojet VP
asserted, claiming that the union "did not raise the health and safety issue in contract negotiations until at least a week prior to the
strike."8 6 He added that the only "real" safety and health issue
was the striker violence "against persons and property." 87 He emphasized that neither TDRH nor TOSHA had ever imposed a fine
or any other penalty on the company because of employee health
matters. 88 TOSH had fined the TNS 520 dollars for a noise violation.89
To the contrary, House Subcommittee Chairman Gore concluded that TNS production increases were given precedence over
worker safety and health. 90 At the conclusion of the hearing, he
stated that the workers who had to go out on strike and as a conse-

80

Gore Hearings, supra note 25, at 104-05.

81Id. at 295.
82

Id. at 105.

83Id.
14

Id. at 298.

at 75, 108, 110.
Id.at 107, 190-214 (union testimony regarding negotiations).
87
Id. at 75.
88
Id.at 298-299.
89
Id.at 299.
15Id.

86

90

Id. at 121.
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91
quence lost their jobs "have suffered a tremendous injustice."
He also hoped that there was "some way to remedy it" to "prevent
an injustice like this from occurring in the future."' 2

D. WHAT IS ABNORMALLY
502 OF THE NLRA

DANGEROUS WORK? SECTION

On July 8, 1981, TNS notified the workers Gore had
praised for having "the guts to put their jobs on the line" 93 that
they had been permanently replaced. 94 On December 3, 1981, five
days before the House hearing began, the Oil, Chemical, and
Atomic Workers Union filed charges with the NLRB. 95 The
NLRB General Counsel, in April 1983, issued a complaint against
TNS alleging that the company had violated the Act by permanently replacing and refusing to reinstate TNS workers who had
ceased work in good faith because of abnormally dangerous working conditions within the meaning of Section 502. 9 6 The complaint also alleged that TNS had interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection as well as engaged in prohibited
discrimination in regard to any condition of employment "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" in
violation of Section 8(a)(3).97
The workers and their union waited 21 months for the
NLRB General Counsel to issue this complaint against the company.98 They would wait another 16 years, until 1999, for a final
NLRB decision.

99

91 Gore Hearings, supra note 25, at 307.
92

Id. at 124.

93 Id. at 107.
94

Id.at 95.

9'See id. at 43.

TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1388-89.
Id. at 1454 n.226.
98 TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1388-89.
99 TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602 (1999).
96

97
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Administrative Law Judge ("AL") Arlene Pacht issued her
decision on the complaint on July 31, 1987 after 67 nonconsecutive hearing days between November 1983 and April 1985 that resulted in almost 13,000 pages of transcript and hundreds of exhibits. 100 Judge Pacht concluded that the employees began and
continued their work stoppage as a good faith protest of abnormally dangerous conditions at their workplace; that objective evidence
supported their belief that conditions were abnormally dangerous;
that Section 502 protected them even though the work stoppage
occurred after the expiration of their collective bargaining agreement; and that these TNS workers "[were] not economic strikers
who may be permanently replaced." 10 1
Five years and five months later, on December 23, 1992,
the NLRB dismissed the complaint in its entirety and ruled that the
General Counsel had failed to prove that abnormally dangerous
10 2
working conditions existed when the employees walked out.
The Board concluded, consequently, that TNS did not commit an
unfair labor practice when it permanently
replaced TNS employ10 3
ees who engaged in the work stoppage.
E. THE ALJ AND FIRST NLRB DECISION: CONTEXT AND
COMMENTARY ON "OBJECTIVE" TEST

Neither of these outcomes was compelled by case precedent, statutory language or legislative history. Instead, it was the
unstated value preferences of the decision-makers and their conflicting perceptions of worker and employer rights, duties, interests, and motivations that were most influential in determining the
meaning of "abnormally dangerous working conditions" and
worker "good faith belief' as set forth in Section 502.
Section 502 of the NLRA states that the "quitting of labor
by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally
dangerous conditions of work" would not "be deemed a strike un-

100

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1348 nn.1-2.

I01Id. at 1454.
102Id, at 1348.
103 Id.
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der this Act."''04 The Administrative Law Judge and the Board
agreed that workers would not have to be killed or injured in order
to prove that a workplace was abnormally dangerous. 105 In the
words of the ALJ, "the very purpose of Section 502 is to guarantee
that employees may withhold their labor before actual damage befalls them."'1 0 6 The ALJ and the Board also agreed that the good
faith belief required to invoke the protection of Section 502 could
not be merely an honest belief but had to be supported by "ascertainable objective evidence." 10 7 The Supreme Court had created
that requirement
in 1974 in dicta in Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine
08
1
Workers.
The Supreme Court's acceptance and application of an objective evidence rule and rejection of a good faith belief standard
in Gateway Coal is an example of a clear choice among competing
values motivated by the personal policy-making preferences of decision-makers.10 9 Nothing in the language of Section 502 or the
legislative history of that statutory provision compelled or required
that choice. 1 0 In fact, Gateway Coal was not an action brought
under Section 502 but rather under Section 301 of the NLRA 1I1 to
enjoin a strike and compel arbitration of a safety dispute under the
provisions of a collective bargaining contract. 112 The Supreme
Court chose the objective evidence requirement to extend the already Court-created federal policy promoting arbitration of labor
management disputes 13 and discouraging strikes.!1 4 Although

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B at 1356.
' Id. at 1436.
6Id. at 1442.

'04
10

1' Id. at 1357.

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 387 (1974).
109 See infra Section.I.
108

110 See infra Section.I.

...
TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1379.
1121d.
113

United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564

(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960).
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Section 502, it
that test leaves some protection for workers under
' 15
preserves "as little of that protection as possible."'
In Gateway Coal, the Supreme Court gave the highest priority to labor peace, stability, and uninterrupted production.
Lawyer-historian Staughton Lynd identified the Court's "inarticulate major premise": "that the highest of all goods is to get the
workers off the streets, or the shop floor, and into the chambers of
some purportedly neutral umpire." 117 The Supreme Court chose
"labor peace at the expense of individual liberty" instead of "individual liberty at the risk of labor peace." 118 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Gateway Coal had decided, to the contrary,
favor the arbitration of
that "considerations of economic peace that
119
here":
weight
little
have
disputes
ordinary
If employees believe that correctible circumstances
are unnecessarily adding to the normal dangers of
their hazardous employment, there is no sound reason for requiring them to subordinate their judgment to that of an arbitrator, however impartial he
may be. The arbitrator is not staking his life on his
impartial decision. It should not be the policy of
the employees to stake theirs on his
the law to 12force
0
judgment.
The Third Circuit required only that workers believed that
conditions of work had become abnormally dangerous because, as
the Court explained, disputes concerning safety and health where
114

Jonathan L. F. Silver, NationalLabor Policy and the Conflict Between

Safety and Production,23 B. C. L. REv. 1,7,22 (1981).
115id.
116

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of America, 414 U.S. 368

(1974).

Staughton Lynd, The Right to Engage in ConcertedActivity After Union Recognition:A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720, 752 (1975).
117

118Id.

119

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 466 F.2d

1157, 1160 (3d Cir. 1972).
20

1

id.
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people worked were not the ordinary type of labor dispute con121
and other economic matters.
ceming wages, hours, seniority
122
They concern life and death.
The Supreme Court, however, chose the opinion of the
Third Circuit's dissenting judge to provide not only the rationale
for rejecting the honest belief standard but also the precise language for an objective evidence test.1 23 The Supreme Court called
"justified" the dissenting judge's assertion that no employer could
expect stability in labor relations because the subjective belief test
"runs directly counter to our national policy of promoting labor
stability" and "opens new and hazardous avenues in labor relations
for unrest and strikes." 124 "I believe," the dissenting judge stated,
that when Section 502 is raised as a justification for a work stoppage, "the union must present ascertainable, objective evidence
conclusion that abnormally dangerous conditions for
supporting its
'' 25
work exist."
The Supreme Court simply asserted that it agreed with the
dissenting judge's unsupported assertion that ascertainable, objective evidence must be presented to support any claim that abnormally dangerous conditions of work existed. 12 6 The Court did
proclaim its own notion of the way things ought to be at the workplace: "absent the most explicit statutory command, we are unwilling to conclude that Congress intended the public policy favoring
arbitration and peaceful resolution of labor disputes to be circumvented by so slender a thread as subjective judgment, however
evidence of any
honest it may be.",127 The majority presented no
1 28
intent.
Congressional
of
sort to support its claim

123

See Gateway Coal, 466 F.2d at 1160.
See id. at 1159.
See Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 386; see Gateway Coal, 466 F.2d at

124

See Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 386; see Gateway Coal, 466 F.2d at

125

127

Gateway Coal, 466 F.2d at 1162.
See Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 386.
Gateway Coal, 414 U.S. at 386.

128

See id. at 385.

121
22

1

1162.
1162.
126
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Under this "objective test" choices still had to be made
concerning what constituted "ascertainable objective evidence"
and how much of that evidence was needed to justify a finding of
good faith. 129 The Administrative Law Judge set a standard that
required "competent evidence" to support the employees' perceptions. 130 It was what she called "a reasonably grounded fear" that
abnormally dangerous conditions existed.13 1 The Board, focusing
more on proof than belief, asserted that the "burden of objective
proof imposed under Section 502 is a heavy one." 1 32 The Board
designed two tests that were most difficult for workers to meet.
One test required a showing "on the basis of objective evidence"
that employees "reasonably believed" that "inherently dangers
conditions" at the workplace "had changed significantly for the
worse, so as to impose a substantial threat of imminent danger if
exposure were continued at the time the employees began to
withhold their services."1' 33 An alternative test required a showing
that the cumulative effects of exposure to radioactive or toxic substances "had reached the point at which any further exposure
' 34
would pose an unacceptable risk of future injury to employees."
Prior to the TNS case, no decision-maker, including the
Supreme Court in Gateway or in any other case, had considered
the meaning of "good faith" and "abnormally dangerous" in situations where workers faced danger from slow-acting toxins and radioactive substances. 135 As Board member Devaney pointed out
in his dissent in the Board's first TNS decision, the Board was
"writing law" on a clean slate. 136 The Board in the second TNS
case said that "this latency period" made the case "one of first
impression."' 37 Rather than develop a new test for the new situa-

Gateway Coal,466 F.2d at 387.
Id. at 386.
131 TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B.
at 1401.
129

130

12Id.

at 1357.

Id. at 1347 (emphasis added).
34
1 Id. at 1357, 1358.
35
1 Id. at 1371.
133

136 TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B at 1371.
137

TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 603.
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tion, however, all decision-makers38chose to apply the ascertainable
objective evidence Gateway test.
The Gateway Coal decision was not about worker safety
and health but about labor arbitration. 39 Consequently, the
courts' and the Board's reliance on Gateway Coal in the TNS litigation was improper. 140 The Supreme Court decision in Gateway
Coal. 1
Coal should have been and should be limited to Gateway
It took some straining by the Supreme Court to weave its references to Section 502 into Gateway Coal's focus on labor peace
through labor arbitration policy.

42

It also took some straining by

decision makers considering refusals to work for reasons of health
and safety to make Gateway Coal the bedrock Section 502 case it
was never intended to be and should not be. 143 The majority
claimed that its reading of the statute was consistent not only with
44
common sense but with Section 502's previous application.
The Court cited four NLRB decisions presumably to demonstrate
consistent previous application of Section 502.145 A review of the
four cited cases confirms, however, that the146line between objective
and subjective was blurry rather than clear.
131 TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 606.
139

Id.

140 id.

141 Id.
142 id.
143

Id.

144 Id.
14 5

146

Id.at 607.
In Knight Morley Corp., which involved dust and heat from a broken

air blower, the Board relied on both the testimony of employees as well as the
expert testimony of an industry hygienist in concluding that conditions might
reasonably be considered abnormally dangerous. Knight Morley Corp., 116
N.L.R.B. 140, 141-43 (1956). In PhiladelphiaMarine Trade Ass 'n, the Board
adopted a Trial Examiner's findings that employees in good faith fear of injury
declined to work if they had to use pallets to unload ships rather than slings.
The Trial Examiner, not wanting to "join in a game of semantics" concerning
"abnormally dangerous conditions," took the position that "whatever the word
used, the weight of a 100-pound bag of sugar falling on a man underneath remains the same;" "it is doubtful if any of the longshoremen who declined to use
pallets... consciously based their decision upon any selection of descriptive
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Fitting the reality of latent harm to workers from continued
exposure into a rigid framework requiring demonstrable and present danger, created an insuperable barrier of proof for employees-what one commentator described as the burden of proving
the unprovable. 147 Devaney charged that the results reached were
determined "by unstated policy considerations that foreclose employee access to the statute. 1 4 8
The NLRB found insufficient proof that TNS workers reasonably believed either that "the dangers which were inherent in
the TNS workplace had changed materially for the worse at or
around the time of the walkout" or that their cumulative exposure
to depleted uranium "had reached a level at which any further exposure would have been unacceptably risky. ' 14 9 The Board
acknowledged that objective proof of abnormally dangerous conditions was "complicated by the insidious nature of invisible hazards which may not result in ascertainable physical injury for

terms, but upon inarticulate concept prompted by fear of getting hit by a falling
bag of sugar." Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 138 N.L.R.B. 737, 753 (1962).
In Redwing Carriers,Inc., employees feared for their safety if they crossed a
picket line of another employer. The Board, while emphasizing that the controlling test was the "actual working conditions shown to exist by competent
evidence" not the "state of mind of the employees involved," also reaffirmed
the standard set forth in Knight Morley: whether the actual working conditions
"might in the circumstances reasonably be considered 'abnormally dangerous."'
Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208, 1209 (1961). In Fruin-ColnonConstruction Co., the Board adopted a Trial Examiner's report that relied heavily on
the testimony of miners working in shafts that their conditions of work had become abnormally dangerous. Fruin-Colnon Construction Co., 139 N.L.R.B.
894, 904-05 (1962). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement,
however, in part because the Board's determination was based on the isolated
testimony of the miners with no expert witness testimony. NLRB v. FruinColnon Construction Co., 330 F. 2d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1964). The Eighth Circuit added: "We do not believe that only the good faith belief of the employees
is necessary to find their work stoppage protected." Id.
147 C. John Cicero, TNS, Inc. - the NLRB's Failed Vision of Worker
SelfHelp to Escape Longterm Health Threats From Workplace Carcinogensand
Toxins, 24 STETSON L. REv. 19, 63-64 (1994).
148 TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1388 (emphasis added).
49

1

Id.

at 1358.
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years." 1 50 The Board took the position, however, that under the
objective test it said was required by Section 502 there had to be
some manifest "present need" for employees to quit the workplace
in cumulative exposure circumstances as well as situations involving immediate physical dangers.1 5 1 The Board found no evidence
that cumulative exposures at TNS had reached a "critical threshold" emphasizing that the record
"does not even establish what the
' 52
threshold level of exposure is."
F. WORKERS'

KNOWLEDGE

The Administrative Law Judge had questioned how employees could be expected to know at what point in time Section
502 could protect their refusal to undergo continued exposure to
radiation. 15 She found that even the most knowledgeable TNS
workers understood little about how radiation affected the body or
what the risks were and that they remained "untutored" because of
incompetent and inefficient company training. 154 The little instruction that did occur was undercut by management comments
that trivialized the possibility of hazards and dulled the employees' sense of danger.155 Because the consequences of radiation
exposure were undetectable until years later, the ALJ understood
why TNS workers continued to tolerate their 1working
conditions
56
situation.
the
remedy
to
TNS
get
to
trying
while

150
151

152

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1357.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1360.

153Id.

at 1400-01, 1437, 1439.

154

Id. at 1443.
Id. at 1439.
156 Id.The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the employees be-

155

lieved in good faith that their working conditions were abnormally dangerous.
Her conclusion was based not only on the testimony of TNS workers and the
RMC report, but also on evidence concerning air quality at the plant; the protracted use of respirators by a substantial number of employees; employees' average whole body exposures to radiation; the "excessive uranium-in-urine levels" that indicated serious risk of kidney damage; the "serious breaches" of
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The Board discounted the TNS production workers' inability to comprehend the conflicting scientific evidence to which they
"were not privy anyway."'1 5 7 According to the Board, these workers knew the risks of working with uranium products due to daily
confrontations with working conditions: "visible DU dust, inadequate ventilating and shielding equipment, furnace blowings, and
unsanitary changing rooms"1 58 In the opinion of the Board, moreover, if the TNS workers in the months and weeks before the work
stoppage had believed that "these or unseen hazards posed abnormal dangers," they or their union would have brought this to the
attention of either TDRH or TOSHA or both. 159 The Board found
had voted on the strike
it revealing that "they did neither until'1they
60
and were on the verge of walking out."
That outcome was the assured consequence not only of
putting the burden of proving the existence of abnormally dangerous conditions on employees but also of making that burden, as
the Board in the first TNS decision did, "a heavy one." 16 1 This also shifted the risks associated with enforcement of Section 502 to
workers most vulnerable to health and safety violations in the first
place and least likely to be able to bear that burden. 16 2 Workers
rarely have the information about workplace safety and health
matters needed to make informed assessments of conditions of
work. 163
disagreed
In TNS, even distinguished
• scientists and experts
• • 164
m i
Empirabout acceptable levels, if any, of exposure to radiation.

federal and state safety and health regulations by TNS; and the company's inadand safety programs." Id. at 1437-40.
equate health
57
1

Id. at 1361.

15 8 id.
59

1

id.

160 Id.
161

Id. at 1357.

Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-up Workplace Law
Enforcement: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1106 (2014).
163 Id. at 1073.
164 See TNS Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 402 (6th Cir. 2002) ("While
162

the urine samples pointed to by the Board exceed the non-binding guideline set
out by the NRC, they are within the standard promulgated by the U.S. Army
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ical studies have confirmed, moreover, that even when informed,
most workers experiencing workplace rights violations remain silent because they fear employer retaliation and believe that any action they might take would be ineffective anyway. 165 The history
of the TNS case reinforces those fmdings. 166 There is also the mistaken presumption that workers know the law and what their
workplace rights are. 16 7 Combined, the lack of safety and health
information, fear of retaliation, and not knowing what is and what
is not protected motivate "most workers to keep their heads down
and avoid making waves."'1 68 Consequently, despite talk about the
right to a safe and healthful workplace, workers
choose to risk
1 69
jobs.'
their
risk
than
rather
safety
their health and
G. OTHER FACTORS
The issue before the NLRB was not whether working conditions at TNS were in fact abnormally dangerous but rather
whether the workers' belief that they were was reasonable (supported by objective evidence) and in good faith. 170 It was unavoidable, however, that the Board and the ALJ had to assess the
working conditions as a necessary part of their determination of
the reasonableness of the workers' belief. 17 1 Although reaching
different conclusions, the AM and the Board, in determining
whether the working conditions at TNS justified workers' belief
that those conditions were abnormally dangerous, considered the
inherent danger of the work risks, standards of permissible
expo172
TDRH.
and
TOSHA
agencies
the
of
actions
the
and
sures,

and adopted by the TDRH, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest
that the Army guidelines are not equally good.").
165

See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 162, at 1073.

166

See id. at 1099.

Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences
on Workers'LegalKnowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 448, 465 (1999).
167

168

See Lynd, supranote 117, at 720.

171

See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 162, at 1073.
See TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 402 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 402 (citing TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1357 (1992)).

172

TNS, Inc., 296 F.3d at 402-03.

169
170
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H. AGENCY ACTION AND INACTION: TOSHA AND TDRH
In its assessments of working conditions at TNS, the Board
found decisive the fact that TDRH never considered shutting down
all or a part of TNS' operations or suspending TNS's operating license. 173 According to the Board, TDRH and the NRC found
working conditions at TNS "plainly in need of improvement" but
"not so dangerous as to require removal of employees from the
plant. 1 74 The Board considered the agency's reactions as "objective" evidence and "essential lest we allow the invocation of Section 502 as an end run around the statutes directly applicable to
worker safety in their industry." 175 The Board said that it was "of
"could have consulted
some significance" that TNS workers
1 76
TDRH before the walkout" but did not.
The ALJ had found that TDRH's "endless correspondence" with TNS revealed the Agency's conviction that the TNS
safety program was inadequate and did not protect workers from
unnecessary radiation. 177 The ALJ also concluded that TDRH,
even if it had been informed about all of TNS' health and safety
deficiencies, would not have shut down the company's operations
because "such a sanction was virtually unthinkable to the Agency's functionaries." '1 78 Although TDRH had the authority to seek
the ALJ pointed out "it was a power never
a license revocation,
17 9
invoked.

In regard to radiation limits, rather than using the maximum dose permitted as the standard, the ALJ held that TNS had a
duty to lessen the risk of harm to its employees by applying the
enforceable regulatory requirement: As Low As Reasonably
Achievable (ALARA). 8 That means employing all reasonable
173

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1356.

174

Id. at 1358.

175 Id. at
76

1

177

1356.

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1445.

178 id.

179 id.

180 10 C.F.R § 20.1101.
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methods to reduce radiation doses as far below established legal
limits as is reasonably achievable. 181 The ALJ identified many
safety and health changes in physical plant engineering and cleaning and ventilation equipment made by TNS after the employees
who walked out had been replaced.1 8 2 Consistent with the
ALARA concept, the ALJ concluded that "it would be an error to
find that abnormal
conditions exist only when regulatory limits are
83
exceeded."'

The Board acknowledged that TNS had a "less than stateof-the-art" exposure-prevention program that for several years before the work stoppage resulted in a level of airborne depleted
uranium contaminants and worker exposure higher than it could
have been if TNS had followed the ALARA concept.8 4 The
Board in its decision emphasized, however, that TNS was not legally obligated to follow standards such as ALARA that were nonmandatory guidelines. 185 The Board also underscored the NRC
Director's testimony during the Gore Hearings that "regulatory
guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with
' 86
them is not required."'
I. INHERENTLY DANGEROUS WORK

In determining when working conditions were abnormally
dangerous NLRB case precedent, according to the ALJ,excluded
"normally or even inherently dangerous" work from the meaning
of abnormally dangerous but recognized that Section 502 could be
involved "when normally dangerous conditions became abnormally so."' 8 7 The ALJ concluded that was precisely what happened at
TNS when the company allowed a hazardous workplace "to denigrate" into one that was abnormally dangerous by failing to overhaul its malfunctioning machinery and instead saddling workers
"' TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1359 (1992).
182 Id. at 1443-44; see id. at 1392-98, 1410, 1440 (specific changes).
183 Id. at 1437.
184 Id. at 1358.
1'Id. at 1349, 1354.
86
1 Id. at 1354, 1361.
187Id. at 1436.
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with burdensome respiratory equipment; failing to maintain a supervisory staff competent to enforce sound health-protecting practices and withholding information about excessive exposures from
' ' 88
the TDRH and employees "beset with uranium contamination.
She also relied on reports and expert testimony concerning
other facilities in the nuclear industry showing that radiation doses
from depleted uranium received by TNS workers were "remarkably higher" than other workers in the industry; that TNS workers
"had an abnormally higher risk of cancer when compared to the
national average for workers in all other nuclear facilities;" and
that TNS employees "were subjected to whole body radiation exposure greater than that89 experienced by 90 percent of their peers in
'1
the nuclear industry."
The Board's discussion of what constituted abnormally
dangerous conditions emphasized the inherent dangers of working
with depleted uranium in an industry "inherently more dangerous
than most."' 190 As a result, in their "normal working conditions,"
TNS workers "faced a greater likelihood of cancer or kidney damage" than most other workers. 19 1 Consequently, the Board asserted, the "benchmark for normalcy" in evaluating claims of abnormal danger is the "prevailing conditions" at the TNS plant-not
experienced by
conditions in the nuclear industry or conditions
19 2
uranium.
depleted
with
working
employees
It did not follow, the Board reasoned, that the "maintenance of prevailing conditions at TNS" transformed "existing dangers into abnormal dangers." '1 93 The Board asserted that the "narrow scope" of Section 502 required ascertainable objective proof
that the workers experienced a substantial increase in the normally
194
high risk of cancer or kidney injury if they remained at work.
Instead, the Board said that at TNS exposure levels remained rela-

188 TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1446.
18 9 Id. at 1416-22, 1442.
190 Id. at 1358, 1365.
191
192

Id. at 1358.
Id.

193 Id. at

1359.

194 id.
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195
tively constant in the few months before the work stoppage.
According to the Board, the only significant change was the expi196
ration of the union-company collective bargaining agreement.
The Board also inferred the absence of a good faith reasonable belief of abnormally dangerous working conditions from the
fact that the employees continued to work at TNS particularly
from March 10, 1981 when their union announced that the employees would walk out over safety and health issues until May 1,
1981, when the work stoppage began.' 97 "It defies credulity," the
Board asserted, even to suggest that employers believed on March
10 that their lives were in imminent danger because of cumulative
exposure to depleted uranium after working in the same conditions
for nearly two months.' 98
In inherently dangerous jobs such as those at TNS, where
threats to worker safety and health are the greatest, workers face
even greater obstacles to demonstrating abnormal conditions of
work. The NLRB in the second TNS decision, for example, defined abnormal as "deviating from the normal condition or from
the norm or average."' 199 Although reaching different conclusions,
both NLRB Boards in TNS considered prevailing conditions of
work as synonymous with "normal., 20 0 Defining whatever exists
as "normal" ignores the possibility that those prevailing conditions
themselves could be abnormally dangerous or seriously threaten
worker health and safety.20 1 It also permits employers individually
and industry-wide to establish the benchmark for what is normal.

195

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1359.

196 id.

19 7 id.
'

98

Id.at 1363.

TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 607 (1999) (quoting Fruin-Colnon Construction Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 894 (1962)).
200 The Board in the first TNS decision considered the prevailing condi199

tions of work only at the TNS plant (TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1358-59
(1992)) whereas the Board in the second case considered a level of danger "reasonably to be expected in the industry." TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 608
(1999).
201 TNS Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 607 (1999).
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Workers are then required to provide evidence that workplace dangers have become "substantially greater" than those
44
"normally
existing" conditions. 202 As Member Devaney put it in
his dissent, "[i]n effect, the more reprehensible the employer is,
the less protection the employees have." 20 3 This way of determining what was "normally dangerous" as opposed to "abnormally
dangerous" adds to the already heavy burden of proof on workers,
in other ways as well. 204 The Board's test in the first TNS case, for
example, defined prevailing conditions at TNS as normal and required evidence from employees that those conditions had
changed significantly for the worse. 20 5 In support, the Board
adopted the reasoning of a prior Board in Anaconda Aluminum
Co. :206

Absent the emergence of new factors or circumstances which change the character of the danger,
work which is recognized and accepted by employees as inherently dangerous does not become "abnormally dangerous" merely because employee patience with prevailing conditions wears thin or their
forbearance ceases.2A
The phrase "work which is recognized and accepted by
employees as inherently dangerous" is clearly the age-old employer common law defense of assumption of risk. 208 The NLRB ALJ
in the first TNS case, for example, explained the ten-fold greater
protection against radiation exposure afforded the public than
workers as the consequence of workers assuming the risk of radiation doses in return for higher wages.20 9
TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1357 (1992).
Id. at 1376.
204 See id.
20 5
Id.at 1359.
206 Anaconda Aluminum Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 336, 344 (1972).
202
20 3

207 id.
208

See id.

209

TNS Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1437 (1992); see also Daniel Construc-

tion Company, 264 N.L.R.B. 770, 771 (1982) (The Board found no violation
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The assumption of risk presumption when coupled with the
notion that prevailing conditions are normal further insulates employers from workers' claims of abnormal danger. Rather than
considering that TNS workers remained at work because of limited options and economic necessity, they were seen as condoning
the prevailing conditions no matter what those conditions were,
even if caused by employer neglect. 210 However viewed-an employer would be permitted to have an unsafe and unhealthful
workplace if condoned by employees; the employer was free to
purchase from workers their right to a safe and healthful workplace; or the workers had voluntarily sold that right to their employer-the application of the assumption of risk value judgment
makes it even more unlikely that workers could obtain Section 502
protection.211
Putting the burden of proof on workers and making it an
onerous one increases the likelihood that workers will lose their
jobs if they seek Section 502 protection. 212 As the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals explained, if workers leave their jobs believing
in good faith that abnormally dangerous conditions of work exist,
they run the risk of discharge for striking in violation of a no-strike
agreement or for engaging "in the unprotected activity of dictating
to management" their conditions of employment should proof fail
to support their belief.213 In 1989, three years before the NLRB's
first decision in the TNS case, the General Counsel for the workers' union pointed out that TNS had "completely renovated" the
plant and installed many of the engineering controls the union had
demanded in 1981.214 He wrote: "[t]he Workers accomplished
what they set out to do-the Section 502 activity forced TNS to
when the employer discharged an employee because "the man knew when he
was hired he was going to be exposed to 'radiation,' that he accepted the risk in
return for which he was paid," and that when the employee refused to do the
work for which he was hired he "lost the right to remain on the payroll.").
210 TNS Inc., 309 N.LR.B. at 1374 n. 11, 1375.
211
Id.at 1375.
212 NLRB v. Fruin-Conlon Construction Co., 330 F.2d
885, 892 (8th Cir.
1964).
213 Id.
214

McKendree, supra note 24, at 209.
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provide a workplace free of the overexposures about which they
had complained-but lost their jobs in the process. 215
Those jobs stayed lost despite or because of over 20 years
of decision-making in the legal process. The high risk of losing
one's job, therefore, is clearly a deterrent to engaging in a work
stoppage and invoking Section 502 protection. 216 At the same
time, in what could be seen as a trap closing, workers who continue to work in danger that they face regularly find that their efforts
are used against them when decision-makers say that a work situation cannot be abnormally dangerous because workers have endured those dangerous conditions for a considerable period of
time. 217 That is true even when workers are trying to hold onto
their jobs while trying to eliminate those dangers.218 This is precisely what happened in the Board's first TNS decision.219
It is often argued (often ignoring economic reality) that
workers who fear for their safety and health where they work are
free to quit and work elsewhere. Focus on the alleged freedom to
quit as well as the assumption of risk presumption have obscured
the fact that the fundamental right at issue is the right of workers
220
to remain at work under safe and healthful conditions.
J. RAUDABAUGH CONCURRENCE

The Board that decided TNS in 1992 was comprised of four
members rather than the full complement of five. 221 All four had

McKendree, supra note 24, at 209.
Id. at 214.
217 TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1360 (1992).
218
Id. at 1374 n.l1.
219 Id.; see also Custodis-Contrell, Inc., 283 N.L.R.B. 585, 589 (1987);
215

216

Robert C. Stephens, The Right to Strike over Safety Issues, 51 CHI. KENT L.
REv. 200,
205 (1974).
220
But see Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Injunctions againstOccupational
Hazards: The Right to Work under Safe Conditions, 1 Berkeley J. of Emp. &
Lab. L. 25, 36 (1976).
221 TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1348 (1992).
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been appointed by Republican Presidents. 222 Member Raudabaugh's concurring opinion agreed that Section 502 did not protect
the TNS workers' walkout but for a totally different reason.223
Raudabaugh read Section 502 and the Supreme Court's decision in
Gateway Coal2 24 to mean that a work stoppage is protected by

Section 502 only if its "sole" reason is to protect employees from
abnormally dangerous conditions.225 The TNS work stoppage was
unprotected, according to Raudabaugh, because it "was caused, at
least in part by a desire to achieve favorable results at the bargaining table. 226
The Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union that represented the TNS Workers successfully petitioned the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to review the
NLRB's order.227 On February 14, 1995, the D.C. Circuit returned
the case to the Board.228 The Court ruled that the result reached by
the Board did not have the support of a majority of its members
because the "sole cause" concurring opinion "can count for nothing in this
case" and, among other things, was "wrong as a matter
229
of law."
222

Chairman James Stevens was appointed by President Ronald Reagan

and Members Clifford Oviatt, John Raudabaugh, and Denis Devaney by President George Herbert Walker Bush. BoardMembers Since 1935, NAT'L LABOR
RELATIONS BD. (last visited May 27, 2019) https://www.nlrb.gov/aboutnlrb/who-we-are/board/board-members- 1935.
223 TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1368.
224 Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 385
(1974).
22 5

Id

Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1369.
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 46. F.3d 82, 82
(D.C. Cir. 1995).
228 Id. at 84-85.
229Id. at 91, 92-93. In regard to Member Raudabaugh's reading of the
226 TNS,
227

Supreme Court's language in Gateway Coal, the D.C. Circuit commented: "[t]o
say that a strike called 'solely to protect employees from immediate danger is
authorized by Section 502' is not the same as saying that 'a strike is not protected by Section 502 unless the sole reason for it is to protect employees from immediate danger."' Id. at 91. The Court also noted that under federal law workers
had the right to engage in economic strikes upon expiration of their collective
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K. A SECOND NLRB DECISION
Over four years later, on September 30, 1999, the NLRB
issued its second decision and order in TNS, Inc., this time concluding that the TNS workers' work stoppage was protected by
Section 502, that the company had violated the NLRA by not reinstating them when they offered to return to work, and by withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain with their union. 230 In responding to the D.C. Circuit's instruction to articulate
a majority-supported rule in TNS-like cases, the Board rejected the
test used in its previous TNS decision because that test placed an
unreasonably heavy burden on employees to substantiate their
good faith belief that working conditions were abnormally dangerous.231
The Board agreed with the D.C. Circuit Court that it was
unreasonable to require proof that safety was the sole cause of the
work stoppage.232 The Board continued, however, to apply the ascertainable, objective evidence test taken from the Supreme
Court's language in Gateway Coal233 "a purely subjective impression of danger will not suffice. 2 3 4 The Board said that determining the nature and quantity of the ascertainable, objective evidence
that would be sufficient to support workers' good faith belief was
235
Unlike the prior
the most difficult task in applying Section 502.
Board, this Board's assessment of the sufficiency of the objective
evidence included consideration of industry standards for a safe
workplace. 236 In regard to what would constitute an immediate

bargaining agreement and that when employees were protesting abnormally
dangerous conditions "that they also deserved better wages is irrelevant." Id.at
92.
230

TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 603 (1999).

231

Id. at 603 n.7.

232 id.

233

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 387

(1974).
234
235

TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 607.
TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 607.

231 Id.at 608.
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threat of harm, the Board did not interpret that to mean that workers had to leave the workplace in a single moment or face serious
injury in the next-particularly in situations of cumulative exposure to radioactive toxic substances. 7
However, similar to the approach used by the prior Board,
the Board in 1999 accepted the notion that Section 502 did not
pertain to inherent routine dangers.238 Section 502 did apply, the
Board held (as did the AID in the prior Board decision), when
a point where they
such risks escalated or were maintained at ~239
posed an immediately existing threat to worker safety or health.
The 1999 Board decided that the evidence cited by the ALJ
in the first consideration of the TNS case regarding air quality, the
protracted use of respirators, and employees' uranium exposures
and "uranium-in-urine" levels constituted sufficient objective
proof to support the workers belief that conditions had become too
unsafe to continue working at TNS. 24 0 Because the TNS workers
had engaged in a protected 502 work stoppage, the Board ruled
that they were not strikers and, therefore, were not subject to the
risk of permanent replacement as were economic strikers. 241 The
Board cited Supreme Court case precedent emphasizing the "inin conduct
herent inequity" of penalizing employees for engaging
242
induced solely by an employer's unlawful conduct.
The Board ordered TNS to offer full reinstatement to 2all
43
employees who participated in the Section 502 work stoppage.
The Board also ordered TNS to make the workers whole for loss
of earnings and benefits from February 15, 1982 (the date of their
rejected unconditional offer to return to work) until TNS made
offer of employment -almost 18 years back pay with
them a valid
244
interest.

237

TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 608 n.31.

238 id.
239
241

Id. at 607.

Id. at 609.

242

Id. at 614.
Id. at 610 (citing Mastro Plastics v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 287 (1956)).

243

Id. at 612.

244

TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 611.

241
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A Board Panel of three-Wilma Liebman, Sarah Fox and
Peter Hurtgen-decided this case.245 All were nominated to the
Board by President William Clinton; Liebman and Fox to "Democrat" seats and Hurtgen to a "Republican" seat.246 Hurtgen dissented, arguing, among other things, that the majority's approach,
would foster an easy escape from no-strike clauses-"a departure
from the sanctity of no-strike clauses" that encouraged work stop247
pages and undermined industrial instability."
Hurtgen argued, in addition, that permanent replacement
was not precluded by Section 502.24 8 He concluded that the workers who engaged in the TNS work stoppage were neither economic
249
strikers nor unfair labor practice strikers but rather "quitters.,
Hurtgen contended that permanent replacement is not equivalent
to discharge because the permanently replaced striker has a right
to reinstatement whenever a replacement leaves or a vacancy occurs in a striker's job.250
He also maintained that it was a "fundamental right" of an
employer to protect and operate his or her business and that an
employer's "economic justification" for operating his business
with permanent replacements during a Section 502 work stoppage
outweighs the limited impact on employee rights. 251 Finally,
Hurtgen emphasized his view that the working conditions at TNS
were not unlawful under the NLRA or any other law.2 52

245

TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 602 (1999)

246

Board Members Since 1935, NAT'L LABOR RELATIONS BD. (last visit-

ed May 27, 2019) https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/who-we-are/board/boardmembers- 1935.
247 TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. at 613.
248
1 d.at 614.
249 id.

250 id.

251

Id. at 615-16.

252

Id.at 613.
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L. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Two years later the Board's second decision in TNS was
before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.253 In reviewing TNS's
challenges to this Board's statutory interpretations, the Sixth Circuit followed the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A v. National Resources Defense Council.25 4 Under that
standard, if Congress has not clearly spoken to a question, the reviewing court must uphold the agency's interpretation if it is
"permissible" and "reasonable" even if it is not the one the court
255
would have adopted.
Applying the Chevron standard, the Sixth Circuit upheld
the Board's determinations that Section 502 applied to situations
where there is no "no-strike" provision; that Section 502 does not
require that abnormally dangerous conditions actually exist; and
that Section 502 prohibits employers from permanently replacing
workers who quit work because of abnormally dangerous conditions.2 5 6

The Sixth Circuit then considered TNS's challenges to the
2 57
Board's application of Section 502 to the facts of the case.
Contrary to the contentions of the company, the Sixth Circuit
found that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's
"factual findings" that TNS workers believed in good faith that
their working conditions were abnormally dangerous and that this
belief was a contributing cause to their stoppage of work.258
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the Board did not find
that working conditions at TNS were "in fact" abnormally dangerous but only that there was sufficient objective evidence to support
employees belief that their working conditions were abnormally
dangerous. 259 Yet, nonetheless, the Court characterized as "not
253
254

See TNS, Inc., v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 2002).
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l. Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

842-43 (1984).
255 See TNS, Inc., 296 F.3d at 389.
256 Id. at 390-94.
217Id. at 394.
258
25 9

Id. at 396.
Id. at

399.
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terribly persuasive" much of the supporting evidence relied upon
by the ALJ in her decision and "merely cited without explanation"
by the Board. 260 The Court then proceeded to observe that whereas TNS workers received higher than average radiation exposure
than other employees in the nuclear industry, that exposure was
not above that permitted by NRC and TDRH regulations.261 The
Court emphasized, moreover, that the NRC regulation on permissible uranium levels in employees' kidneys was "only a nonbinding guideline" never adopted by the NRC and that the TDRH
used a more permissive standard.26 2 In sum, the Court concluded
that the "pieces of evidence" on which the Board relied to support
its finding that TNS employees believed their conditions of work
were abnormally dangerous, "merely
show that TNS had largely
2 63
limits.
regulatory
with
complied
In a sad and shameful ending to these workers' experiences
with the legal system, the Sixth Circuit Court vacated the Board's
decision because the Court did "not see a reasonable way to hold
the Company responsible for damages accruing over all of this
time, especially when its structure and business changed in the intenm." 264 Over 21 years had passed since 100 men and women
had refused to continue working under what they believed were
abnormally dangerous conditions at TNS Inc. and sought enforcement of a law they believed would justify their action and
protect their jobs. 265 After 21 years the decision-makers
who ap266
neither.
did
law
the
that
them
told
law
that
plied
In January 2003, the Supreme Court declined to consider
whether the Sixth Circuit had erred in vacating the Board Order.2 6 7
In its petition for Supreme Court review,268 the workers' union
TNS, Inc., 296 F.3d at 402-03.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 401.
263 Id. at 402.
264 Id. at 404.
261 Id.at 386.
266 Id.at 404.
267 Paper v.TNS, Inc., 537 U.S. 1106 (2003).
268 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy
260

261
262

Workers Indus. Union v. TNS, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003) (No. 02-557).
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maintained that the Sixth Circuit's decision to invalidate the
Board's action altogether not only denied innocent employees a
wrongdoing but also excused TNS's
remedy for the company's
269
violation of the Act.
The NLRB, then with a majority of Board members and a
General Counsel nominated by George Walker Bush, concluded
its role in the TNS case when its General Counsel joined with TNS
in contending that the case did not raise an issue warranting further review by the Supreme Court.27°
M. BEYOND SECTION 502: SECTION 7 OF THE NLRA
What workers experienced at TNS is commonplace in other circumstances when administrative agencies and the judiciary
have interpreted the provisions of laws written to protect vulnerable workers-such as OSHA and Section 7 of the NLRA which
encourages workers to engage in concerted action for their own
mutual aid and protection-in ways that undermine efforts to refuse to work for reasons of health and safety. 271 They have chosen
instead to craft rules that increase the risks and consequences for
workers who refuse to work in those circumstances.272
Consequently, the workers' dilemma-refuse work and
risk my job or work and risk my body-remains a daily reality. In
addition, the tangled and confusing and different rules pertinent to
Section 502, Section 7 of the NLRA, and OSHA leave workers
even less aware of their rights and what protections they have, if
any, and more dependent on "experts" in the legal process. As
noted previously, not knowing what is protected causes workers to
"keep their heads down and avoid making waves" 273 In addition
to being a choice of one hom of the workers' dilemma-work and
risk my body-the heads down and make no waves approach is a
269

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy

Workers Indus. Union v. TNS, 537 U.S. 1106 (2003) (No. 02-557).
270

Brief for NLRB at 6, Paper, Allied-Indus., Chem. & Energy Workers

Indus. Union v. TNS, Inc., 537 U.S. 1106 (2002) (No. 02-557).
271 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
272 See Lynd, supra note 117, at 720.
273

Id.
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variation on the right to quit solution which also ignores the fundamental right of workers to remain at work under safe and healthful conditions.
As seen in the TNS case, these extra-legislative, agency or
court-created rules are themselves often only the embodiment of
the values of the judges or agency members asserting the rule.27 4
Section 7 of the NLRA is that law's core source for the protection
of workers' rights. Judicial and NLRB decisions concerning the
extent to which Section 7 provides protection to refusals to work
for reasons of safety and health provide additional examples not
only of the value-inspired choices of those decision-makers but also of the confusing tangle of inconsistent rules and standards uti275
lized in applying different statutory provisions.
In the first major case of its kind, almost 20 years before
the TNS workers walked off their jobs in protest of what they believed were abnormally dangerous working conditions, a unanimous Supreme Court in NLRB v. Washington Aluminum 276 concluded that refusals to perform hazardous work were protected
under Section 7. The Supreme Court upheld the right of seven
employees to walk off the job in protest of "bitterly cold" temperatures outside ranging from a low of 11 degrees to a high of 22 with
a broken oil furnace inside the plant. In startling contrast to the
reaction of decision-makers to radiation exposure by TNS workers, the Court in Washington Aluminum was moved to say that the
workers were trying to protect themselves and "to correct conditions which modem labor-management legislation treats as too bad
to have to be tolerated in a humane and civilized society like
277

ours."

Although the Supreme Court in Washington Aluminum assessed the gravity of the employees' working conditions, the Justices emphasized that the reasonableness of workers' decisions to
engage in concerted activity is irrelevant 2 7 8 Since then the ques-

See Paper v. TNS, Inc., 296 F.3d 384, 389-94 (6th Cir. 2002).
275 NLRB v. Tamara Foods Inc., 692 F.2d 1171, 1179 (8th Cir. 1982).
276 NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 9 (1962).
277
Id. at 17-18.
278 Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 16.
274
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tion of whether the conditions which workers protest are in fact
unsafe has been irrelevant to the determination of whether their
Section 7 rights have been violated. As the Board put it in Union
Boiler Company, "the issue here is not the objective measure of
safety conditions, it is whether these employees left their jobs because they thought conditions were unsafe. 279 Years later, the
NLRB, citing Washington Aluminum, rejected the contention that
the Board should require "objective ascertainable evidence" to
support any claims of unsafe conditions:
The Board's policy is clearly a wise one. It is to
the interest of employees and employers alike that
concerns such as potential safety problems be
brought to light; a requirement that the complaint
be meritorious in order to be protected would discourage such concerns from being surfaced.28 °
The Board has distinguished the standard it uses in Section
502 cases to define abnormally dangerous conditions from the
standard it uses in Section 7 cases.
Consequently, Section 7
protects the rights of workers to engage in protests, including work
stoppages, over what they believe are unsafe or unhealthful working conditions.282 The Board's use of a good faith belief standard
rather than an objective proof standard lightens the employees'
burden of proof and lessens the risk of job loss for refusing
to per283
form work they believe threatens their health and safety.
Section 7 of the NLRA sets forth several workers' rights:
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
Union Boiler Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 818, 818 (1976).
Keystone-Seneca Wire Cloth Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1979).
281 See Vemco, Inc., 314 N.L.R.B. 1235, 1240 (1994); Odyssey Capital
279
280

Group, 334 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111 (2002).
282 Tamara Foods, Inc., 258 N.L.R.B. 1307, 1308 (1981) (enforcing
NLRB v. Tamara Foods Inc., 692 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982)); see also Brown &
Root, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 33, 36 (1979); E. R. Carpenter Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 18,
21 (1980); Colorado Forge Corp., 260 N.L.R.B. 25, 36 (1982).
283 Union Boiler Co., 213 N.L.R.B at 818.
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own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.284 The exercise of these rights, however, is not unlimited.
Workers who engage in a work stoppage, even for reasons of
health and safety, for example, are subject to being replaced permanently (as were the TNS workers) according to the same rules
governing economic strikers. 285 Workers covered by no-strike
agreements would not be protected by Section 7 if they engaged in
concerted work stoppages.286
The workers at the Washington Aluminum Company were
unorganized.287 The overwhelming number of workers covered by
the NLRA and its Section 7 are unorganized -possibly 90 percent
or more. 288 Among the unorganized are those who are most vulnerable to the violation of their workplace rights and bear a disproportionate risk to their workplace safety and health. Even under the more protective terms of the Washington Aluminum
decision, the risks of initiating and pursuing rights enforcement
have to be borne by those most vulnerable to the exercise of power
by others including their employers. 2 89 All of the reasons for
workers to stay silent and keep their jobs and risk their health and
safety-fear of employer retaliation, the perceived futility of protesting, a lack of knowledge of what their rights are or how to enforce them-apply to all workers but more so to unorganized
workers.
Unorganized employees' Section 7 rights are detrimentally
affected in another important way. In order to be protected by
284

NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12-13 (1962).
285 NLRB v. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
286 Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 107 (1962) (explaining that the extent of their Section 7 protection has been restricted further,
even in situations without no-strike agreements, by a Supreme Court ruling that
agreements to arbitrate give rise to an implied promise not to strike); Paper v.
TNS, Inc., 296 F.3d 384, 384 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that what prevails is
the court-created policy of resolving labor-management disputes through arbitration).
287 Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 12.
211 Id. at 13 n.6.
289

Id.
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Section 7, employees must also prove that they were engaged in
"concerted activity" for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection. NLRB and judicial decisionmakers have disagreed over what is protected concerted activity
and unprotected individual activity or "personal gripes.,, 290 The
result once again has been a confusing and inconsistent set of rules
defining concerted activity, one applying to organized employees
and a different one to unorganized employees.
In regard to organized workers, the NLRB in Interboro
ContractorsInc. 291 established the principle that an individual employee was engaged in concerted activity and protected by Section
7 when asserting a right grounded in a collective bargaining
agreement:
However, even if the complaints were made by
John alone [a discharged employee], they still constituted protected activity since they were made in
the attempt to enforce the provisions of the existing
collective bargaining agreement. The Board has
held that complaints made for such purposes are
grievances within the framework of the contract
that affect the rights of all employees in the unit
and thus constitute concerted activity which is protected by Section 7 of the Act.2 92

The Board has applied the Interboro precedent broadly, including safety and health issues. In T&T Industries, Inc.,29 3 for
example, where an individual employee refused to drive a tractor
alleged to be unsafe because it was blowing fuses, the Board held
that "where an employee complains about safety matters which are
embodied in a contract he is acting in the interest of all the em-

290

Robert Gorman & Matthew Finkin, The Individual and the Require-

ment of 'Concert' under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
286, 290 (1981).

291 Interboro Contractors Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1298 (1966).
292 id.

293 T & T Indus., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 517, 520 (1978).
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ployees covered by the contract in attempting to enforce those
provisions and such actions are294held to constitute protected concerted activities under the Act.,

In 1984, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. City DisposalSystems295 upheld the Board's Interboro doctrine as a reasonable interpretation of the Act. 296 In City Disposal, the employer discharged a truck driver hauling garbage after the driver refused to
drive a truck he believed to be unsafe because of faulty brakes and
had challenged his supervisor by asking "what you going to do,
put the garbage ahead of the safety of the men?" 297 The relevant
contractual clause provided: "[t]he Employer shall not require employees to take out on the streets or highways any vehicle that is
not in safe operating condition or equipped with the safety appliances prescribed by law." 298 The Supreme Court found that this
lone worker's invocation of a right grounded in his collective bargaining agreement was concerted activity because it was "an integral part of the process that gave rise to the agreement":
That process-beginning with the organization of a
union continuing into the negotiation of a collective
bargaining agreement, and extending through the
enforcement of the agreement-is a single, collective activity.. .Moreover, when an employee invokes a right grounded in the collective bargaining
agreement, he does not stand alone. Instead he
brings to bear on his employer the power and resolve of all his fellow employees.299

294

T & T Indus., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. at 520 (ruling that Section 7 protec-

tion is not dependent on the merits of the asserted contract claims or whether
the employees expressly refer to applicable contracts in support of their actions
or are even aware of the existence of such agreements).
295 NLRB v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 822 (1984).
29 6
Id. at 841.
297 Id. at 827.
298 Id. at 824-25.
299 Id. at 831-32.
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The Supreme Court also found that, although there is nothing in the legislative history that specifically states congressional
understanding of concerted activities, the Interboro doctrine was
"entirely consistent with the purposes of the Act, which explicitly
include the encouragement of collective bargaining." 300 The Court
added that the Interboro doctrine preserved the integrity of the collective bargaining process because, by invoking a right grounded
in a collective bargaining agreement, the employee "makes that
right a reality." 30 1 Concerted activity, moreover, required only an
honest invocation of a contractual right.30 2 It did not require the
employee
to be correct in his or her belief that a right had been vi30 3
olated.
The Supreme Court in City Disposal did not address what
would constitute concerted action involving unorganized workers
without collective bargaining agreements. Even in the absence of
collective bargaining agreements, the NLRB had found individual
worker protests concerted if the protests involved matters affecting
the working conditions of other employees30 4 and remedying those
complaints would benefit other employees.
The Board extended this approach to individual employee
protests concerning health and safety rights contained federal and
In Alleluia Cushion Co., 0 6
state statutes other than the NLRA.
for example, the employer discharged an unorganized employee
who, acting alone, had complained to the California OSHA office
about safety conditions. 30 7 The Board asserted that safety was one
of the most important conditions of employment and of great and
continuing concern for all workers. 308 The Board also emphasized
that Congress had recognized and confirmed that "vital interest"
by enacting the Occupational Safety and Health Act as had many
300

City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. at 833-34.

301

Id. at 835-36.

302Id. at

840.

303 Id.

3 Gorman & Finkin, supranote 290, at 296.
305 Id. at 303-04.
30
6 NLRB v. Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. 999, 999 (1975).
307 id.

308

Id. at 1000.
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state and local governments through the passage of similar legislation.3°9
The Board also decided that the NLRA "cannot be administered in a vacuum., 3 10 The Board "must recognize the purposes
and policies of other employment legislation, and construe the Act
in a manner supportive of the overall statutory scheme.,

3 11

The

Board concluded that the discharged employee's protest was concerted as well as protected:
Since minimum safe and healthful employment
conditions for the protection and well-being of employees have been legislatively declared to be in the
overall public interest, the consent and concert of
action emanates from the mere assertion of such
statutory rights. Accordingly, where an employee
speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions
relating to occupational safety designed for the
benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent thereto
deem such activity to be concerted.312
The Board appointed by President Ronald Reagan in the
1980s, however, reversed many major policy decisions, covering
at least two decades of NLRB history-including a long line of
13
Board decisions expanding the definition of concerted activity.
In Meyers Industries, Inc.3 14 that Board explicitly overruled Alleluia Cushion.315 The Board said that henceforth it would apply an
"objective standard" to determine if an employee's activity was
309
3 10

Alleluia Cushion Co., Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. at 1000.
id.

311 Id.
312 id.
3 13

See JAMES A. GROSS, BROKEN PROMISE: THE SUBVERSION OF U.S.

1947-1994, 246-47, 354, 358 (Temple University
Press: 31
Philadelphia
1995).
4
NLRB v. Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493,496 (1984).
LABOR RELATIONS POLICY,

3 15

id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

43

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 36:2

concerted. 316 It would require that the activity be engaged in with
or on the authority of other employees.31 7 The Board maintained
inherent in Section 7" compelled this objective
that the "principles
38
standard. 1
Kenneth Prill, whose protest and firing at Meyers Industries triggered this case, had complained unsuccessfully about malfunctioning brakes and steering on the truck he was assigned to
drive. 3 19 While driving in Tennessee, Prill was involved in an accident caused by defective brakes on his truck.320 After being told
by the president of Meyers Industries to have a mechanic check
the truck "but to get it home as best he could,, 321 Prill on his own
contacted the Tennessee Public Service Commission. 322 The
Commission put the truck out of service due to defective brakes
and other problems. The employer's Vice-President terminated
Prill's employment because "we can't have you calling the cops
like this all the time." 323 The Board, applying its objective standard, found that Prill's protest was not concerted, because he "acted
324 Consequently, Section 7 did not prosolely on his own behalf."
325
tect him from discharge.
The Board-granting that Prill's situation was a "sympathetic one" and allowing that the Board, too, might be outraged by
an employer, who risked the life of a driver and others traveling
the highways, by squeezing "the last drop of life out of a trailer
that had clearly given up the ghost,"-asserted that it was "not
empowered to correct all immorality or even326illegality arising under the total fabric of Federal and state law."

316

317

318

Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. at 496.
Id.at

497.

Id. at 496.
319
Id. at 497.
320 Id.
321 Id.
322 id.

323

Id.at 498.

324 id.
325 Id.
326

Id.at

499.
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On petition to review the Board's order in Meyers, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, while expressing no
opinion about the correctness of the Board's test of concerted activities, decided that the Board erred in assuming that the NLRA
mandated the Board's more restrictive and substantially narrower
327
standard for determining what constitutes concerted activity.
The Court, in remanding the case to the Board for reconsideration,
noted that the Board did not have the "benefit" of the Supreme
Disposal when the Board decided the
Court's opinion in City
328
case.
Meyers Industries
The D.C. Circuit also pointed out that the Board's decision
in Meyers I created an "anomaly": that an organized worker who
complains about a safety or health matter covered by a collective
bargaining agreement would be protected under Interboro and City
would be denied protecDisposal, while an unorganized employee
329
conduct.
identical
in
engaging
for
tion
After remand, the Board in Meyers II adhered to its defmition of concerted activity. 330 The Board agreed that it had a duty
to construe the NLRA to accommodate other federal laws but
maintained that whereas the "invocation of employee contract
rights is a continuation of an ongoing process of employee concerted activity," an unorganized employee's "invocation of statutory rights is not., 33 1 On review of Meyers II,332the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's decision.
N. SOME OBSERVATIONS
In some important ways, organized and unorganized workers covered by the NLRA can use their Section 7 rights to engage
in concerted action for their mutual aid and protection, including
refusals to work in unsafe and unhealthful conditions.333 WashingPrill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 942 (1985).
Id. at 953.
32 9
Id. at 957.
330 Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 889 (1986).
133 Id. at
888.
332 Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (1987).
327

328

...
Id. at 1483.
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ton Aluminum and subsequent applications of that decision have
relieved employees seeking Section 7 protection of the burden of
proving with "objective, ascertainable evidence" that the conditions they were protesting were in fact unsafe or unhealthful.334
Not having to prove that their claims are meritorious but only that
their protests were based on a good faith belief lessens the risk
employees assume when they protest conditions that threaten their
health and safety.335
This lessened risk does not matter much, however, when
these same Section 7 protesters, if engaging in a work stoppage,
can be permanently replaced; they are treated no differently than
economic strikers even if they are protesting health and safety
conditions. 336 This means either that "prudence" prevails and
there is no concerted refusal to work on the one hand or on the
other that those who do strike to protest health and safety conditions are permanently replaced and their employers proceed as
they choose, defeating the intent of the Act-as happened to the
workers at TNS. 37
The Board's definition of concerted activity in Meyers II
resulted in what the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals warned would
be the anomaly of having identical conduct protected by Section 7
if engaged in by a single organized employee but not protected if
engaged in by a single unorganized employee.338 Professors
Finkin and Gorman referred to this "extraordinary anomaly"
caused by that construction of the term "concerted" resulting in
statutory protection for an act "engaged in by two employees
while 9the very same action engaged in by one remains unprotect33
ed."
The Board's interpretation of concerted activity is more
than an anomaly revealing inconsistency and causing confusion
334

Keystone-Seneca Wire Cloth Co., 244 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1979).

335 Id.
336 id.

Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1388-89 (1992).
Prill,755 F.2d at 957.
339 Gorman & Finkin, supra note 290, at 329; see also Matthew W.
Finkin, Labor Law by Boz - A Theory of Meyers Industries,Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., and BirdEngineering,71 IOWAL. REV. 155, 157 (1985).
337 TNS,
338
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for workers: it strikes at the core justification for the Act that affects all employees organized and unorganized. 340 The emphasis
of the Wagner Act was on the relative helplessness of individual
workers when confronted with the power of their employers. 341
The Act was intended to increase the liberty and dignity of individual workers by encouraging them to increase their power by
acting collectively:
The assumption of the Act was not that action
which should be protected when engaged in by a
group should be left unprotected when engaged in
by the individual, but that individual action should
not become unlawful when engaged in collectively... But there is not the slightest hint in the history
of the NLRA that in attempting to expand the protection that the law would give to group activity to
secure benefits or improvements, Congress contemplated a less favored status for individual activity having the same objective.342
As Gorman and Finkin concluded, "at the core of the freedom of the individual to protest in a group necessarily lies the
freedom of the individual to protest at all."34 3
Treating all work-related claims of individual employees
as within the scope of concerted activities 344 is the interpretation
most consistent with the legislative history of the NLRA as well as
most protective of employees' Section 7 rights, and most consistent with the Act's encouragement of all workers to exercise
those rights and to pursue work-related issues such as their own
safety and health.345

340

Gorman & Finkin, supra note 290, at 344.

341

Id. at 336.

Id. at 336, 338 (emphasis in the original).
Id. at 345.
344Id. at 309.
345 Gorman & Finkin, supra note 290, at 329.
342

3 43
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The current denial of Section 7 protection to individual unorganized employees, who are employees at will, leaves them
open to discipline, including discharge, or other forms of employer
retaliation for insubordination if they refuse to work for reasons of
health and safety-and leaves employers free to do S0.346 That recreates the same pre-Act employer power and worker helplessness
that the Act was intended to eliminate.
Workers vulnerable to such charges and consequences fear
pursuing their workplace rights individually and their co-workers
fear joining any employee who would or does protest.347 It also
gives unscrupulous employers an incentive to discharge an individual before that protester has an opportunity to enlist fellowemployees.34 8 Such "preemptive strikes" also prevent employees
from engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.34 In
any event, chilling messages are conveyed to workers.

0. THE

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970
was the federal government's first comprehensive attempt to regulate workplace safety and health.35 ° In Section 2 of the OHSA
Congress declared it to be its purpose and policy "to assure so far
as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions."' 351 In order to achieve that objective, Congress imposed two major duties on employers. Employers were obligated to comply with the safety and health standards
set by the Secretary of Labor and, in what is known as the "general
duty clause", to provide employment and a place of employment

See Prill,755 F.2d at 957.
Finkin, supra note 339, at 157.
348 Parexel Int'l, 356 N.L.R.B. 516 (2011).
346

347

34 9

Id.

David Michaels, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and
U.S.
Department of Labor, Testimony before the U.S. Senate CommitHealth,
tee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Apr. 27, 2010) in OSHA Archive.
351 29 U.S.C. § 65 1(b) (2012).
350
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"free from recognized hazards that are causing 352
or are likely to
cause death or serious physical harm" to workers.
Section 11(c) prohibited discharge or discrimination
353
against any employee who exercised a right afforded by the Act,
but contained no provision addressing explicitly workers' right to
refuse work because of unsafe or unhealthful conditions. Consequently, the Secretary of Labor issued a regulation interpreting
Section 11(c) to contain an implied but limited right to refuse
work for reasons of health and safety. 354 The Secretary's regulation protected an employee against discrimination if that employee
with no reasonable alternative refused in good faith to perform
work that a reasonable person would conclude posed a danger of
death or serious injury in a situation so urgent that there was insufficient time to eliminate
the danger through OSHA's regular en355
channels.
forcement
Some appellate courts upheld the validity of the Secretary's regulation but most did not. 356 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, for example, feared that the Secretary's regulation "could
disrupt or cripple an employer's business." 357 That Court added
that the legislative history of OSHA "is manifest that Congress
feared such a result." 358 Opponents of the regulation, such as the
Fifth Circuit, relied mainly on Congressional rejection of two most
hotly contested proposals in the Senate and House bills leading to
OSHA. 3 One proposal would have given the Secretary of Labor
the authority in urgent, imminently dangerous situations to take0
36
action, including, if necessary, shutting down an entire plant.
Economic consequences for employers dominated the debate:
352

29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(b) (2012).

1 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2012).
354 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12 (1979).
315 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2).

James H. Swain, ProtectingIndividual Employees: Is It Safe To Complain About Safety?, 9 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 59, 86-87 (1988).
357
Id. at 87.
358 Marshall v. Daniel Construction Co., 563 F.2d 707, 711-15 (5th Cir.
1977).
359
Marshall,563 F.2d at 715.
360
356

Id. at 720.
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"lost production time as the result of disruption or shutdown of
plants was seen as increasing the cost of doing business, contributing to inflation, and generally causing American business to be
less competitive.,, 36 1 The proposal was defeated and the Secretary
was authorized only to seek court-ordered action in such situations.362
The other proposal in Congressman Daniels' bill would
have recognized the right of employees whose work exposed them
to toxic substances to "absent themselves from risk of harm with363
out loss of regular compensation" under certain circumstances.
That proposal was derided as "the right to strike with pay," a label
which almost by itself defeated the proposal.36" Opponents also
maintained that unions could use the provision to avoid contractual no-strike agreements and that individual workers could abuse
365

it.

Congressman Daniels' proposal, however, was neither an
unreasonable burden on employers, nor an invitation for worker
and union abuse, nor an invitation to strike with pay. The proposed language would have permitted employees and employers to
ask the then Department of Health, Education and Welfare
("HEW") to determine if any substance normally found or used at
the workplace had potentially toxic or harmful effects.3 66 If HEW
found such potentially harmful effects, an employer would be given 60 days to correct the situation during which time an employer
could not require any employee to be exposed to such substances-unless the material was labeled with information concerning
the hazards involved, the symptoms of overexposure and precautions to be taken and the employer provided personal protective
equipment. 367 If the conditions were not corrected after 60 days and the employer had not informed employees of the hazard and
361

Susan T. Preston, A right under OSIIA to Refuse Unsafe Work or a

Hobson's Choice ofSafety or Job?, 8 U. BAL. L. REv. 519, 532 (1979).
362 Id. at 532.
363

Id. at 529.

364 Id. at 530.
36 5
1 d.at 530.
3

1

367

Id. at 529-30.
Preston, supra note 361, at 529.
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had not provided employees with personal protective equipmentthen employees were permitted to remove themselves from risk of
harm "for the period necessary to avoid such danger without loss
of regular compensation" for that period.368
The Daniels proposal was intended to compel employer
compliance with the law by seeking expeditious determinations of
health and safety threats, requiring speedy action to eliminate
those threats, and placing the economic consequences of noncompliance on the employer not the employees subject to the
health and safety danger. 369 It was also intended to prevent employees from being
economically coerced into risking their health
37
to keep their jobs.

0

The Secretary of Labor's regulation was another instance
of a clash between profits, production and management authority
and the protection of worker safety and health. In 1980, a unani371 decided
mous Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall
that the Secretary's regulation "clearly conforms to the fundamental objective of the Act-to prevent occupational deaths and seri372
ous injuries."
Whirlpool Corporation manufactured household appliances. At its plant in Ohio it installed horizontal wire-mesh guard
screen approximately 20 feet above the plant floor to protect employees from objects that occasionally fell from overhead conveyers. 3 73 Each week, maintenance workers would remove objects
from the screen. In 1973, the employer began to install heavier
wire in the screen after several employees had fallen through the
old screen and a number of maintenance workers had complained
to their foreman. 374
In 1974, a maintenance employee fell to his death through
an area of the old screen that had not been replaced.375 Two
368
369
370

371

H.R. 16785, 91st Cong. § 19(a)(5) (1970).
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980).
Id. at 14 n.20.

Id. at 2.

372Id. at
373
374

11.

Id. at 5.
Id.

375 Id.
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maintenance workers, unsatisfied with the employer's response to
their complaints about the safety of the screen, obtained from the
plant safety director contact information for the local OSHA representative. 3 76 The safety director cautioned them that they "had
better stop and think about what [they] were doing."37 7 The next
day, the same two employees were ordered to work on a section of
the old screen. When they refused, claiming that the screen was
unsafe, they were sent home without pay for the remaining six
and written reprimands were placed in their
shift
hours of their 37
8
personnel files.

One month later, the Secretary of Labor filed suit charging
that the employer's action against the two maintenance workers
constituted discrimination in violation of Section 11(c)(1) of the
Act. 3 79 Eventually, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether the Secretary's regulation authorizing employee "selfhelp" in some circumstances was permissible under the Act.380 In
finding that the regulation conformed to the purpose of OSHA, the
Supreme Court also emphasized that the law's remedial approach
was designed to prevent death or serious injury, not to wait until
death or serious injury occurred. 381 The Court quoted a sponsor of
the Senate bill: "[w]e are talking about people's lives, not the indifference of some cost accountants. We are talking about assurthat
ing the men and women who work in our plants and factories382
they will go home after a day's work with their bodies intact."
The Supreme Court concluded, that given this preventative
intent, it would be "anomalous" to deny an employee with no oththe employee "reaer alternative the freedom to leave a workplace
383
sonably believes is highly dangerous."
In regard to the fears that the Secretary's regulation would
be costly to business, the Court emphasized its belief that because
376

Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 6.

377 Id.
378
3 79

Id. at 7.
id.

380

Id. at 8.

381

Id. at 11-12.
at 12 n.16.

32Id.

38 3

Id.. at 12.
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of its stringent requirements and limited scope the Secretary's regulation would have minimal effect on and rarely interfere with
employers' business operations.38 4 The Court also made it clear
that, under the Secretary's regulation, employers were not required
to pay employees who refused work in situations of immediate
danger.
In response to the argument that under the Secretary's regulation workers could shut down an employer's operation-an authority that Congress had denied the Secretary of Labor-the Supreme Court pointed out that employees had no power to require
employers to correct hazardous conditions. 386 In what could only
further discourage workers from seeking the protection of the regulation's already limited right to refuse work, the Supreme Court
cautioned that any employee who acted in reliance on the regulation ran the risk of discharge or discipline if a court found that the
employee acted unreasonably or in bad faith.3 87
P. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Protection of workers' right to refuse work that threatens
their health and safety is essential if workers' right to a safe and
healthful workplace is to be achieved. Instead, decision-makers'
interpretations of Sections 7 and 502 of the NLRA and the Secretary of Labor's regulation concerning refusals to work for reasons
of health and safety under OSHA have not freed workers from the
workplace health and safety dilemma they have faced long before
any of these provisions existed.3 8 8 What the ALJ in TNS called a
"Hobson's choice" 389 remains. In some cases, interpretations have
increased the risk of job loss, others lessened that risk somewhatbut in keeping the risk of refusal high in all cases they have effec-

384

385
386

Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S.

at 21.

Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.

387 Id.

388

Cicero, supra note 147, at 26, 32-33, 109.

319 TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1454 (1992).
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tively denied workers the exercise of their right to refuse hazardous work.39 °
In part this is due to a legal system in which decisionmakers "safely ensconced in their chambers" have the power to
determine what constitutes reasonable behavior by workers such
as those at TNS is likely to produce outcomes remote from the realities of workplace dangers. 391 In addition to their distance from
workplace reality, these decision-makers' preoccupation with legal
theorizing increases the influence on outcomes of their own personal value choices among different goals and policy preferences.
These decision-makers were the ones who defined abnormally
dangerous, good faith, inherently dangerous work, immediate danger, and assumption of risk.39 2 They also decided that employers
did not have to prove that their workplaces were safe and healthy
for employees.
Rather, decision-makers agreed that it was
workers who had the burden of proof; that the workers' burden
could not be met by their subjective judgment "however honest it
may be; ' 394 and that the workers were obliged to provide ascertainable, objective evidence acceptable to these decision-makers or
otherwise risk losing their jobs as unprotected
strikers subject to
395
permanent replacement by their employer.
The ALJ in TNS commented that "employees are particularly vulnerable and must trust their employer not to expose them
to abnormal danger" especially when the hazard is "invisible, silent and latent" as it was at TNS.396 She went on to say, however,
that TNS had "exacerbated rather than abated dangers" and had
See Emily A. Spieler, Risks and Rights: The Casefor Occupational
Safety and Health as a Core Worker Right, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AS HUMAN
RIGHTS 100, 100 (James Gross ed., 2003).
391NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 929 (2d Cir. 1967); Larry Drapkin, The Right to Refuse Hazardous Work after Whirlpool, 4 BERKLEY J. OF
EMP. & LAB. L. 29, 45 (1980).
392 Drapkin, supra note 391, at 45,
52, 54.
393 Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 38485 (1974).
39 4
Id. at 386.
391 Id. at 386-87.
396 TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 1348, 1443 (1992).
390
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"revealed a greater regard for productivity than for human wellbeing., 397 Decision-makers' choices have made it safe for employers to do that. 398 The workers experience at TNS and with the
legal system demonstrates that relying on employers, administrative agencies, and courts to protect their safety and health can be
futile, self-defeating, and, in any event, insufficient. It leaves
workers without control of their own safety and health at the
workplace.
A different standard for judgment is needed-one that is
consistent with NLRA's Section 502's stated protection of employees who cease work because of abnormally dangerous work,
Section 7's encouragement of worker actions on behalf of their
mutual aid and protection, and OSHA's express purpose to ensure
all working men and women in the country safe and healthful conditions of work. 3 9 9 For many reasons, OSHA's General Duty provision is or should be that standard of judgment.
Using OSHA Article 5(a)(1), the General Duty clause, as
the standard of judgment in refusal to work cases would harmonize rather than compartmentalize rule applications across Section
502, Section 7 and the Secretary of Labor's regulation. 4 00 It would
recognize that worker rights such as freedom of association, the
right not to be discriminated against and safety and health are so
interrelated that all are necessary to the realization of any one.
The Supreme Court did recognize the interrelatedness of labor
laws in Whirlpool when the Court upheld the Secretary of Labor's
refusal to work regulation, in part, because it was consistent with
"the general pattern of federal labor legislation" (Section 502 and
Section 7) affording workers the right "to walk off their jobs when
faced with hazardous conditions.' '4 1 The NLRB in Alleluia Cush-

97

TNS, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1446.

398 But see Jeffrey Hilgert, The Future of Workplace Health and Safety as
a FundamentalHuman Right, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POE"Y J. 715, 735 (2013).
399 Gross, supra note 11, at 387.
4o Donald L. Morgan & Mark N. Duvall, OSHA's GeneralDuty Clause:
An Analysis ofIts Use and Abuse, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 283, 284 (1983); Gross,
supra note 11, at 382.
401 Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 18.
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ion 40 2 stated the interrelatedness of labor laws most precisely:
"[t]he National Labor Relations Act cannot be administered in a
vacuum. The Board must recognize the purposes and policies of
other employment legislation, and construe0 3the Act in a manner
4
supportive of the overall statutory scheme.
In support, the Board cited the Supreme
Court's decision in
4 °4
NLRB:
v.
Company
Steamship
Southern
[T]he Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act
so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other
and equally important Congressional objectives.
Frequently, the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another, and it is not too much to
demand of an administrative body that it undertake
this accommodation without excessive emphasis
upon its immediate task.4 °5
This harmonization would not mean that the NLRB would
administer OSHA or that OSHA would administer the NLRB. It
would mean that the agencies, whenever possible, would construe
their respective statutes in ways that would accommodate and
support the purposes of the overall statutory scheme.40 6

402
40 3

Alleluia Cushion, 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975).
Id. at 1000.

404 Id.

(citing Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942)).
Southern Steamship Co., 316 U.S. at 47.
406
See ExaminingDelays in OSHA 's Standard-SettingProcess and the
Impact on Worker Safety, HearingBefore S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor
andPensions, 112th Cong., (2012) (examples of inter-agency cooperation concerning safety and health); Memorandum from Anne Purcell, Associate General
Counsel, to All Regional Directors, Officers In Charge, and Resident Officers,
(May 21, 2014) (on file with NLRB Website); Jim Morris, How Politics Gutted
Workplace Safety, SLATE: MONEYBOX (July 7, 2015),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/07/osha-safety-standar
dshow-politics haveunderminedftheagency-s ability.html; see OSHA
INTERNATIONAL, https://www.osha.gov/intemational/ (last visited May 28,
405
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This "general duty" clause constitutes an entirely new philosophy in regard to workplace safety and health. The enforceable
statutory recognition in Section 5(a)(1) expresses that workers
have a right to be free of workplace dangers to their health and
safety.40 7 It places responsibility on employers to take affirmative
action to improve workplace conditions and reduce work related
illness and injury.4 °8 The "general duty" clause also shifts emphasis from compensating victims, the body in the morgue approach,
to prevention of injury and illness.4 °9
Using the "general duty" clause as the standard for judgment, therefore, would markedly change the definition of "abnormally dangerous" without requiring changes in legislation. "Normal" would now be a workplace in compliance with the law,
which is a workplace free from all recognized, predictable, and
preventable hazards likely to cause death or serious injury. "Abnormally dangerous" would be any workplace that had recognizable and predictable hazards that could be prevented but were not
and were likely to cause death or serious injury.
The "general duty" standard would shift the burden of
proof from employees to employers.4 10 The burden would be put
on the parties who are responsible with providing, controlling, and
maintaining safe and healthful work and workplaces. The focus
would shift, therefore, from the prerogatives of property and management rights to the duties of property ownership and management authority.

2019) (examples of international cooperation); see Workplace Safety: Ensuring
a Responsible Regulatory Environment,Before the Subcomm. on Workforce
Protectionsof the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 11 th Cong. (2011)
(statement of David Michaels, Assistant Secretary, OSHA) (examples of agency
adaptation to different workplace circumstances).
407 Morris, supra note 406.
408 Nicholas A. Ashford and Judith I. Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions:
Employee Rights Under the Labor ManagementRelations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 802, 827 (1977).
409 Drapkin, supra note 391, at 32.
410 See Ashford & Katz, supra note 408, at 827.
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It would no longer be a "catch me if you can ' 4 11 approach
to workplace safety and health in a system designed to make employers difficult to catch by requiring employees to be the catchers
and making the catching process onerous and risky. Instead, employers would have the burden of eliminating from the workplace
all well-recognized and preventable hazards that are likely to
cause death or serious injury of a worker. 4 12 Employers would
have the burden, therefore, of proving that their workplaces were
of an employer to do so
in fact safe and healthful. The failure
413
act.
willful
presumptively
a
be
would
Shifting the burden to employers also diminishes the risk
to employees who have had to jeopardize their employment on the
dim prospect that some decision-maker sometime later will find
their refusals to work justified.4 14 Under the general duty standard, therefore, holding employees to a subjective good faith test
rather than to any objective evidence of proof test best achieves
not only the primacy of safety and health but also the active participation of employees in the enforcement of their right to safe and
healthful work and workplaces.4 15 The subjective good faith test
is one necessary way, among others, to bring about the end of the
work and risk life and limb or refuse work and risk their jobs dilemma now imposed on workers.4 1 6
Use of the general duty standard would reduce the job risk
to workers involved in or contemplating refusals to work by redefining abnormally dangerous in a way that expands the statutory
protection of Section 502 and the Secretary's regulation concern-

411

Tripp Baltz, OSHA To Release Proposalby End of Year, Michaels

Tells Public Health Association, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 11, 2010),
https://www.bna.com/osha-release-proposal-n4964/.
412 See id.
413 Putting Safety First: StrengtheningEnforcement and Creatinga
Culture of Complianceat Mines and Other Dangerous Workplaces: Hearingbefore
the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor. & Pensions, 111 th Cong., (2010) (testimony of David Michaels).
414 See Ashford & Katz, supra note 408, at 805-06.
415 Id.
4 16

id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol36/iss2/3

58

Gross: Undermining Worker Safety and Health Protection through Statutory
UNDERMINING WORKER SAFETY

2019]

ing refusals to work.4 1 7 The redefinition of abnormally dangerous
as compliance with the general duty clause, for example, would
widen the scope of protection for organized employees working
under no-strike agreements who refuse to work in abnormally
dangerous conditions because those work stoppages would not be
considered strikes.4 18
The redefinition of abnormally dangerous, moreover,
would apply to unorganized as well as organized and to individual
workers as well as those acting collectively. Section 502 refers to
the quitting of labor by "an employee or employees" and OSHA
protects individual complainants and does not require concerted
activity.4 19 Utilizing Section 502 rather than Section 7 would render irrelevant impediments to individual action imposed by the
42 °
Board's decision in Meyers Industries.
Although neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has addressed the issue, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in TNS upheld the Board's ruling that Section 502 protections apply to situations where there is no no-strike provision.4 2 1 The Court's opinion
makes it clear that the coverage of Section 502 extends to unorganized employees as well as unionized workers: "[i]t would seem
somewhat anomalous to provide this protection to unionized employees subject to a collective bargaining agreement that includes
a no-strike clause but deny it to unionized employees not working
under such a collective
bargaining agreement and to all non422
employees.
unionized
Section 502 recognizes that there is something exceptional
about workers' refusal to work because of abnormally dangerous
conditions.423 The Sixth Circuit in TNS pointed out that Section
502 confers "special protection" on workers who quit work in the
424
good faith belief that their workplace is abnormally dangerous.
Ashford & Katz, supra note 408, at 806.
Drapkin, supra note 391, at 30.
419 29 U.S.C. § 143 (2012).
420 Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986).
421 TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2002).
412 Id.at 391.
423 Id. at 394.
417
418

424

Id.
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The Court upheld the last Board's position in TNS that Section 502
prohibited the permanent replacement of such workers.4 25 The
Court held that Section 502 "protection is meaningless if companies can simply replace these employees as if they were normal
economic strikers. 'A26 The Sixth Circuit cited its earlier decision
in Clark EngineeringConstruction:
When a work stoppage properly results from abnormally dangerous working conditions, an employer cannot resort to the weapons available to
him in an economically-motivated work stoppage... the very natures of the two types of work
stoppage are entirely different.427
The Board in its final TNS decision emphasized the unfairness of penalizing employees
for actions induced by an employ4 28
conduct.
unlawful
er's
The workers' dilemma cannot be eliminated without removal of the fear of permanent replacement for engaging in a
work stoppage protesting abnormally dangerous conditions of
work. Equating the definition of abnormally dangerous with compliance with the statutory requirements of the general duty clause
means that employees invoking protection for their refusals to
work would be claiming in fact that their employer was engaging
in unlawful conduct.429
The general duty clause standard for what is abnormally
dangerous work would also expand the scope of what would be
considered justifiable refusals to work under the Secretary of Labor's regulation. 430 The Supreme Court in Whirlpool found that
the Secretary's regulation ensured that employees "will in all circumstances enjoy the rights afforded them by the 'General Duty'
425
426

TNS, Inc., 296 F.3d at 393.
Id. at 394.

427

Clark Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of

Am., 510 F.2d 1075, 1080 (6th Cir. 1975).
428 TNS, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 602, 610 (1999).
429

Id.

430

Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 13 (1980).
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clause.' '431 The Court saw the Secretary's regulation as an aid to
the full effectuation of the law's General Duty clause which placed
on employers a mandated obligation to prevent deaths and serious
injuries.432
The Secretary's regulation, as did the Supreme Court in
Gateway Coal,43 3 refers only to situations where the danger is immediate and urgent. As the TNS cases highlighted, however, the
knowledge and consequences of certain health hazards are not
known or manifested until years later. 434 The general duty clause
applies to health as well as safety hazards. 435 It does not distinguish between health and safety hazards in obliging employers to
provide work and workplaces free of recognized hazards causing
or likely to cause death or serious injury. Use of the general duty
clause as the standard for defining what constitutes abnormally
dangerous work, therefore, would not distinguish among types of
danger or immediate or longer-term risks as long as the recognized
hazards involved were predictable, preventable, and were causes
or likely causes of death or serious injury.
OSHA has not restricted its activities solely to matters of
safety. Although criticized, the agency has issued health standards
and, over the years, has sought to protect workers from various
recognized hazards from exposure to chemicals and other substances known to cause cancer and neurological problems over
436
time.
Adoption of the general duty clause as the measure of what
constitutes abnormally dangerous work would also deny employers the common law defense of assumption of risk which shifts all
liability to employees.437 The general duty clause, imposes on
employers the affirmative obligation to eliminate from the workplace all recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause
431
432

Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 13.

Id. at 12-13.

Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. at 386; Whirlpool Corp., 445 U.S. at 3.
See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
435 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
436 See Gross, supra note 11, 352-56.
43 7
8ee Richard S. Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARv. L. REv. 998, 1003-04 (1973).
431

414
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death or serious injury. Assumption of risk becomes, therefore, a
concept or defense irrelevant to employers' liability.438 It would
also be irrelevant to the determining of abnormally dangerous
work.
Employers would no longer be able to purchase immunity
from having unsafe and unhealthful work and workplaces by buying from employees' waivers of their right to safe and healthful
conditions of employment. Under the general duty standard such
economic transactions would in no way alter employers' liability
to eliminate serious work hazards. 439 The fact that some employees were willing to work even in abnormally dangerous conditions
also would not relieve employers of their obligation to eliminate
such hazards. Even employers in "inherently dangerous" operations would be obligated to eliminate all predictable and preventa440
ble hazards causing or likely to cause death or serious injury.
There are abnormally dangerous hazards that can be eliminated
even in inherently dangerous operations.
Overall the general duty clause as a standard for determining what constitutes abnormally dangerous work would shift the
burden of proof from employees to employer, deny employers
their common law defense of assumption of risk, broaden the definition of what is abnormally dangerous work under Section 502 of
the NLRA and the Secretary of Labor's regulation, and protect
workers who engage in work stoppages from permanent replacement or disciplinary action. 441 In other words, it would eliminate
the key elements of the current
standards that create and perpetu44 2
ate the workers' dilemma.

438
439

Morey, supranote 437, at 1003-04.

at 1005.
& Duvall, supra note 400, at 297.
"A' See supra notes 411-12 and accompanying text.
442 In addition to their obligations under the General Duty Clause, emId.

440 Morgan

ployers are also required to comply with the occupational safety and health
standards issued by the Secretary of Labor. OSHA's standard issuing process
has fallen far short of being a major, if not the most important instrument for
achieving the law's objectives. Morgan & Duvall supra note 400, at 283 (expectations concerning standards). Some say the standard-issuing system is
"broken." Time Takes Its Toll: Delays in OSHA's Standard-SettingProcess
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The workers' dilemma must be eliminated if workers are to
become actively involved in the promotion, protection, and enforcement of their own rights to safety and health at their workplaces. The refusal to work for reasons of safety and health is essential to securing those rights. This paper proposes, for several
reasons, a set of value choices and new rules based on those value
choices that should govern workers' refusal to perform work that
they believe threatens them with death or serious injury. The core
reason is that "it is in fact the right to life that we are talking about
when we are talking about worker safety. '"443 Workplace-related
injuries and diseases are not merely economic costs and inefficiencies-they kill people quickly or slowly. 44 4 Consequently, the
question of worker safety and health is more a moral question than
an economic one.
The moral principle that human life matters more than authority, competitiveness, efficiency, production and profit margin
is not new and it has diverse sources. Internationally, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights consider workers' rights to safety and health fundamental human rights. 4 5 In 2011, David
Michaels, then Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of OSHA, in
testimony before Congress called the right to work in a safe work-

and the Impact on Worker Safety, 112th Cong. 2 (Apr. 19, 2012) (statement of
Sen. Tom Harkins). The standard-setting was made increasingly difficult over
the years by statutory and administrative procedures, employer opposition and
constant court challenges, and "hard look" standards ofjudicial review concerning what constitutes "significant risk" and judicial requirements that OSHA
provide quantitative evidence that all standards were economically and technologically feasible and requiring OSHA to proceed individual standard by individual standard and industry by industry. One consequence of inhibiting standard promulgation and restricting its scope, however, has been the concomitant
expansion in the scope of the General Duty clause. Id.
443 Spieler, supra note 390, at 78, 94.
444Morey, supra note 437, at 993.
445 Spieler, supra note 390, at 82-83.
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place a "basic human right." 446 The International Labor Organization's Declaration of Philadelphia affirms that labor is not a commodity-not some kind of44human
resource no different from any
7
production.
of
other factor
As discussed, although they did not use the term human
rights, Congressman Gore (no employer has the right to endanger
the health of its workers), Secretary of Labor Wirtz (rejecting human sacrifice for the development of progress and asserting the
absolute priority of human over economic values) and Senator
Yarborough (emphasizing that at issue were people's lives, not the
indifference of some cost accountant) all expressed a commitment
to the priority of human life.4 4 8
The General Duty clause is most consistent with the moral
principle of the priority of human health and safety at the workplace. The prevalent value scheme, to the contrary, deters workers
from protecting their own health and safety by jeopardizing their
jobs, if they refuse to perform work that seriously threatens their
health and safety. Instead of making workers fearful of protecting
their own safety and health, adoption of the General Duty clause
as the standard of what constitutes abnormally dangerous work, on
the other hand, would make employers fearful of violating the law,
if they do not eliminate all such predictable and preventable hazards. 449 The core moral principle of the priority of human life is
also most consistent with the preventive intent of OSHA. Whereas the prevalent standards being applied reflect the humans as resources, compensation-based body in the morgue approach that
OSHA was intended to replace.
Ultimately, workplace safety and health, particularly workers' ability to exercise their right to refuse unsafe and unhealthful
work, is a clash between economic values and interests and the
core moral principle of the priority of human life. Although it did
446

OccupationalSafety and Health Administration U.S. Dep 't of Labor,

Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce Subcomm. On Workforce Protections (Oct.
5, 2011) (statement of Asst. Secretary David Michaels, PhD, MPH).
44' Spieler, supra note 390, at 87.
448 See supra notes 38, 12 and accompanying
text.
449 See Morey, supra note 437, at 1005; see also Morgan & Duvall, supra
note 400, at 283.
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not concern the OSHA General Duty clause directly, the 1981 Supreme Court decision in American Textiles Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan45 is an excellent illustration of that clash of
values.
Section 6(b)(5) of OSHA requires the Secretary of Labor
in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials to set a
standard "which most adequately assures to the extent feasible... that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to
the hazard dealt with by such standards for the period of his working life. ''451 The Secretary of Labor in promulgating the Cotton
Dust Standard, determined that exposure to cotton dust represented a significant health hazard to employees and promulgated the
most stringent standard to protect against material health impairment. 452 OSHA found the Cotton Dust Standard to be technologically and economically feasible.453
The Textile Employer Association asked the Supreme
Court to reject the standard because the Secretary failed to demonstrate "that the reduction in risk of material health impairment
[was] significant in light of the costs of attaining that reduction.'A 54 The Secretary responded that this was a cost-benefit
analysis in disguise that would require "placing a [dollar] value on
455
human life and freedom from suffering.
The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase "to the extent
feasible" to mean "capable of being done.''45 No cost-benefit was
required by the statute, the Court concluded, because Congress
had already determined the relationship between the costs and
benefits "by placing the 'benefit' of worker health above all other
considerations save those making attainment of this 'benefit'
unachievable. ''457 The Court found that Congress used the term
450

See American Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
29 U.S.C. § 655-(b)(5) (2012).
452 American Textile Mfr. Inst., 452 U.S. at 493.
453
Id. at 503.
454
Id. at 506.
45 Id. at 507.
451

456Id. at 508-09.
457

Id. at 509.
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458

feasible to confirm that the Act did not require absolute safety.
At the same time, the Court emphasized that Congress knew that
the Act would "impose real and substantial costs of compliance on
industry, 459 yet "intended to impose such costs when necessary to
create a safe and healthful working environment. ' '46° The Court
upheld the Cotton Dust standard even though the Secretary found
marginal employers may shut down rather than comthat "some
461
ply.
The Supreme Court quoted Senator Yarborough who
asked:
One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it
too expensive for the company who for lack of
proper safety equipment loses the services of its
skilled employees? Is it too expensive for the employee who loses his hand or leg or eyesight? Is it
too expensive for the widow trying to raise her
children on meager allowance under workmen's
compensation or social security? And what about
the man-a good hardworking man-tied to a
wheelchair or hospital bed for the rest of his life?
That is what we are dealing with when we talk
about industrial safety.462
The discussion and recommendations presented in this paper are intended to dislodge established mindsets and value choices and substitute choices based on values that give priority to human life at workplaces and, in refusal to work situations, enable
currently shut out workers to exercise control over their own safety and health.
A caveat: the meaning of all the terms in the general duty
clause such as "recognized hazards, .... likely to cause," "serious

458

American Textile Mfr. Inst., 452 U.S. at 514.

459 id.

460
461

462

Id. at 520.

Id. at 53 1.
Id. at 520-21.
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physical harm," "free from" and others in OSHA such as "to the
extent feasible" are as susceptible to the values of decision-makers
as were the terms "abnormally dangerous," "good faith belief,"
and "concerted activity. 463 One should never underestimate the
ability of decision-makers in the legal systems to interpret words
to mean what they want them to mean.

463

See generally id. (explaining the susceptibility of the meaning of terms

in the general duty clause).
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